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Abstract: This article joins an important conversation about the proper role 
of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) in the administration of civil 
justice. Both ADR and formal adjudication are being reconceptualized as 
ADR matures into an alternative system, and as ADR methods and 
methodology are incorporated into formal adjudication. Professor Main 
invokes the history of Equity, another “alternative” system, to inform our 
understanding of the forms and limits of ADR. He envisions ADR and 
formal adjudication as dual systems of dispute resolution, and uses the 
Equity analogue as a template to develop a theory of ADR.
ADR: THE NEW EQUITY
Thomas O. Main*
The course of justice is like the alternation of the seasons. There is the 
hope and inspiration of spring and the achievement and reward of 
summer, and there is the descent and sacrifice of autumn and the moral 
and intellectual destitution of winter, and the changes in our jurisprudence 
will come accordingly in spite of us, however much we may be the 
appointed instruments in their consummation.1
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of ADR has transformed dispute resolution. As both a 
rival and a complement to formal adjudication, ADR presents an alternative 
forum for most disputes. ADR offers a system with procedural flexibility, a 
broad range of remedial options, and a focus on individualized justice. ADR 
performs convenient and useful works that cannot be done, or cannot easily 
be done, through formal adjudication. And in every case in which one of the 
various modes of ADR offers a process or reaches a result that differs 
materially from those of the formal courts, there is in fact a rival system. 
Thus contemporary civil justice may be administered by dual systems of 
formal adjudication, on one hand, and a constellation of ADR methods on 
the other. 
The administration of justice through divided systems is a familiar 
model. For centuries the Anglo-American legal system administered justice 
through the systems of law and equity. The law courts ensured uniformity 
and predictability, while courts in equity tempered the law to the needs of 
the particular case. Although there was considerable tension between the 
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two regimes, they were also symbiotic. Over time the law courts adopted 
many of the best practices of equity. Meanwhile, efforts to crystallize the 
jurisdiction of equity introduced complexity and procedural technicalities 
that turned that system into a jus strictum differing little from the common 
law. With each system looking increasingly like the other, law and equity 
were merged into a single system in a wave of reforms in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. The reformers envisioned a unified procedural 
apparatus that would permit judges to jointly administer the substance of 
both law and equity. However, an important ingredient of the jurisprudence 
of equity was displaced by the procedural merger: a merged system offered 
no recourse from the procedural apparatus itself when the unique needs of a 
particular case demanded a different procedure. Moreover, the substance of 
equity lost much of its vitality in the merged system.
The system of ADR stands in this breach created by the merger of law 
and equity. ADR offers an alternative system for relief from the hardship 
created by the substantive and procedural law of formal adjudication. 
Moreover, the freedom, elasticity and luminance of ADR bear a striking 
resemblance to traditional Equity, offering relaxed rules of evidence and 
procedure; tailored remedies; a simpler and less legalistic structure; 
improved access to justice; and a casual relationship with the substantive 
law. Alas, the dark side of ADR is also reminiscent of the vulnerabilities of 
Equity: unpredictability, secrecy, and the inability to reach beyond the 
parties immediately before it.
The reincarnation of equity through ADR illustrates a pervasive 
dialectic between law and equity. Conflict between the goals of certainty 
and individual justice has created an ambivalent attitude in the law toward 
equity, to which the law is attracted by reason of the identification of equity 
with a general sense of justice, but which the law ultimately rejects because 
of the law’s concern for certainty. Hence, a vibrant system of equity 
mediated the strict law until it, too, became bound and confined by the 
channels of its own precedents and the technicalities of its own procedures. 
ADR emerged, in turn, as the equitable alternative. And the pattern repeats: 
the remarkable popularity of ADR leads inevitably, albeit ironically, to 
reforms that would constrain that very system.
This Article uses an equity paradigm to develop a theory of ADR and, 
where necessary, to guide reform. Preserving equity through ADR is 
important because no set of prohibitive or declaratory rules will do justice 
in all cases or will anticipate all situations. Because unimaginable events are 
inevitable, some alternative or escape from formalism is important. Indeed, 
equity, not codification, is the progressive force in the law. When formal 
adjudication cannot provide a plain, adequate and complete remedy, the 
system of ADR should be flexible enough to deliver individualized justice. 
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The repeated exercise of that protean jurisdiction identifies systemic failures 
of the formal system and ultimately wields a reforming influence. The need 
for an autonomous system of discretionary law is as great as or greater than 
ever. I thus argue that equity should make the most of the modern 
instrument, ADR, as it once did of the subpoena.
This Article consists of five steps. Parts I and II are largely descriptive. 
Part I briefly describes the emergence of ADR as a court of general civil 
jurisdiction. Part II calls attention to the characteristics of traditional equity 
that are echoed in the system of ADR. 
Parts III and IV analyze the dynamic and oppositional forces of law and 
equity. Part III focuses on the interplay of those forces between the 
traditional dual systems of Law and Equity. Part IV focuses on the 
contemporary dual systems of formal adjudication and ADR. 
Finally, Part V is prescriptive. I argue that flexibility and discretion 
should prevail in ADR processes even when pragmatism may demand detail 
and complexity. ADR must be free of the procedural paraphernalia of 
certainty and predictability to perform its complementary role in the 
administration of justice through dual systems. Contemporary efforts to 
standardize and restrict the processes of ADR recognize the right problem, 
but propose the wrong solution. The problem is the number and significance 
of cases that are resolved outside of formal adjudication. The solution is not 
the reform of the (alternative) system that is drawing them in, but rather 
reform of the (formal) system that is driving them away.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SYSTEM OF ADR
There are numerous social, cultural and practical forces that steer 
disputing parties away from state-sponsored adjudicatory processes.2
Accordingly some grievances never become disputes at all.3 Some disputes 
are resolved through private negotiations that lead to consensual solutions.4
2 See generally Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the 
Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC. REV. 525 (1981) (describing the range and reporting the incidence of 
grievances, claims, and civil legal disputes).
3 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think 
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4, 12-16 (1983) 
(suggesting that “only a small portion of troubles and injuries become disputes; [and] only a small portion of these 
become lawsuits”; and even when Americans file suit, they are more likely to settle than to litigate); Michelle M. 
Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1609 (2002) (reporting that “HPMS data showed that only 13% of negligent injuries … 
resulted in malpractice claims”); William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing,
9 LAW & SOC. REV. 63, __ (1974) (noting that persons with grievances will often “lump it” to avoid potential 
conflict).
4 See, e.g., Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of 
Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW & SOC. REV. 701, 713-14 (1977) 
(finding only 3.7% voiced complaints studied reached any third party; only 16% of those brought to third parties 
were brought to a lawyer or court); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute 
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976) (exploring the relationship between negotiation and 
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And some disputes are resolved in a triangulated process facilitated by a 
neutral third party who is not a judge.5 Even among those cases that are 
pursued in the courts, the vast majority are resolved by means other than a 
judicial determination.6 The many paths of extrajudicial dispute resolution 
have been trod for centuries, and probably always will be.7
Certain contours of the dispute resolution landscape changed in the 
1970s, however, as formal adjudication faced especial criticism and 
pressures.8 There was an “explosion” of new and complex cases.9
official processes).
Even when a dispute is resolved by settlement, the aggrieved may not take the additional step(s) required to 
be compensated. According to a fee-based service that offers to search its database of recent class action 
settlement funds, “more than half of those entitled to payment fail to file a claim.” Unclaimed Class Action 
Lawsuit Settlement Funds Search, at http://www.unclaimedassets.com/class_action_lawsuit.htm (last visited Jan. 
31, 2005).
5 See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND 
OTHER PROCESSES 6-9 (3d ed. 1999); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door 
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
297, 309-28 (1996); Lon Fuller, Mediation—Its Form and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971).
6
 A federal court study shows that in 2002 the percentage of federal civil cases tried had dropped to 1.8% 
from 11.5% in 1962. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related matters I 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. E MPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 459 (2004).
7 See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 4 (1983) (“In many and varied communities, 
over the entire sweep of American history, the rule of law was explicitly rejected in favor of alternative means for 
ordering human relations and for resolving the inevitable disputes that arose between individuals.”); ROBERT 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 137-40 (1991) (arguing that “legal 
instrumentalists have tended to underappreciate the role that nonlegal systems play in achieving social order”).
When we look realistically at the way disputes are resolved currently in even the most State-saturated society, 
it is obvious that State dispute resolution techniques play only a backup role. From two teenagers bickering 
the backyard to disputes among giant corporations, State techniques, if pertinent at all, come to the fore only 
if all else fails…. State law is the Johnny-come-lately on the scene, because the State itself is a relatively 
recent development.
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 4 
(1992).
For earlier reports of data collections regarding the high ratio of settlement to trial, see Marc Galanter and 
Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 
1339-40 (1994); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, WIS. L. REV. 
631, 662 (1994); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89 (1983); H. 
LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT 3 (1980); Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers’ Ethics in 
Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577 (1975); H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF 
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 217 (1970).
The history of arbitration, in particular, has been successfully mined. See, e.g., Paul L. Sayre, Development 
of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1927-28); Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of 
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 132-34 (1934); FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 3 (1952); William C. Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief 
Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193; James B. Boskey,  A History of Commercial Arbitration in New Jersey, 8 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 1 (1976) (tracing English and colonial roots of commercial arbitration); Bruce H. Mann, The 
Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 NYU L. REV. 443 (1984); 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. 
L. REV. 931 (1999). 
For some history of the mediation movement, see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE 
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 15-32 (1994).
8
 Some scholars might date the transformation to the previous decade. See JAMES ALFINI, ET AL., 
MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2001) (“[M]ediation’s prominence and expanded use emerged in the late 
1960’s as part of the ‘movement’ known as ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution.’”); but see id. at 12 (“As activities 
coalesced during the 1970’s, several important efforts to improve practice and theory emerged.”).
9
 John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Macklin Fleming, Court 
Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE 109 (1970); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National 
Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767 (1977); Maurice Rosenberg, Let’s Everybody Litigate?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1349 
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“Discovery abuse” reached intolerable levels.10 And an unprecedented lack 
of civility among lawyers delayed the resolution of cases and jeopardized 
the reputation of a profession.11 Critics complained that ordinary citizens no 
longer had meaningful access to the courts;12 business clients, too, were 
demanding more efficient dispute resolution alternatives.13
Acknowledging a certain amount of “deferred maintenance” in the 
courts, Chief Justice Burger convened in April of 1976 The National 
(1972); Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil To Promote Justice That Is Civilized, 69 MICH. 
L. REV. 797, 808 (1970-1971) (“A comprehensive reinvestigation of the question which human disputes belong in 
the courts and which ones do not is long overdue. One reason for this undertaking is practical necessity. Our 
courts are simply and plainly being engulfed by a tidal wave of litigation, criminal and civil.”). See generally 
Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 292 
n.44 (2002) (claiming that the term “litigation explosion” first appeared in print in 1970 and attributing it to 
Justice Macklin Fleming of the California Court of Appeals); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: 
Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury 
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985 (2003) (“The contemporary perception of a crisis in the judicial 
system first became prominent in the 1970s”); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (discussing the “litigation explosion”); Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and 
Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States 
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465 (1984) (same); Maurice Rosenberg, 
Devising Procedures That are Civil to Promote Justice That is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797, 801 (1970-1971) 
(referring to “glutted calendars and mobbed courtrooms; the unconscionable delays, alternating with rush-rush-
rush; the mistreatment of jurors and witnesses; the excessive expense; [and] the tarnished image of justice for 
millions of Americans”); Alan O. Sykes, Cases, Courts and Congestion in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 327, 
328 (Nader, ed. 1969) (“Part of the difficulty in getting rid of court congestion appears to be … [that] it is not 
simply an accidental defect of the law, but is rooted in some of the legal system’s most cherished 
characteristics.”).
10
 Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 
VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978); C. RONALD ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE (1979).
11 See Warren Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as 
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RIGHTS 1 (1975).
Two other reform currents may merit mention here. First, it was during this decade that prohibitions on 
advertising by lawyers were lifted. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Russell G. Pierce & Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084 
(November 1983). Second, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was created in 1969 when the 
American Bar Association grouped and adopted nearly 50 canons from various state bar associations. See 
generally Jason J. Kilborn, Who’s in Charge Here?: Putting Clients in Their Place, 37 GA. L. REV. 1 (2002).
12 See, e.g., Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1001 & n.16 (1978-1979) 
(“Our legal system has taken too literally the ancient maxim, ‘de minimis non curat lex.’”) (quoting REGINALD 
HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 41 (1924)); Laura Nader and Linda R. Singer, Law in the Future: What are 
the Choices? Dispute Resolution…, 51 CALIF. ST. B. J. 281 (July 1976); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, SOME 
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1973); Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant 
Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the World-Wide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. 
REV. 181 (1978); Russell G. Pearce, Patrick W. Shea & Jeffrey W. Stempel, An Assessment of Alternative 
Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122 (1980); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION-
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION SURVEY ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (Barbara Curran, Rptr., 1976); 
Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979) (bemoaning “the persistent inaccessibility of judicial relief for 
poor and middle-class people”).
13 See, e.g., Raymond G. Leffler, Dispute Settlement Within Close Corporations, 31 ARB. J. 254 (1976); 
Timothy S. Hardy & R. Mason Cargill, Resolving Government Contract Disputes: Why Not Arbitrate?, 34 FED. 
B.J. 1 (1975); __ Haltzmann, The Value of Arbitration and Mediation in Resolving Community and Racial 
Disputes Affecting Business, 29 BUS. LAW. 1005 (1974); Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?, 
REGULATION, Mar./Ap. 1978 at 15; ARBITRATION-COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS (A. 
Widiss, ed. 1979); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigaiton: Case Management, Two-
Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 253 (1985); Deborah R. 
Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal 
System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 181 (2003) (discussing the early effort of the business community in “getting 
to yes and getting rid of juries”).
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Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice.14 This extraordinary event brought together three 
hundred conferees from the bench, bar and academia.15 The varied agendas 
of this crowd adumbrated dozens of problems ranging from diversity 
jurisdiction and the prosecution of victimless crimes to the right to a jury 
trial and the dearth of empirical research.16 The conference “arous[ed] a 
new spirit of zeal for fundamental procedural reform” and endorsed 
innovation.17
Our own great hope for the Pound Conference is that it will be remembered in 
the year 2000 not simply as a lively colloquium of experts but as the occasion 
when, under the strong leadership of the Chief Justice, Twentieth Century law 
reform in the United States really got under way. For this reason, we invite the 
reader’s particular attention to the reports of the Pound Conference Follow-Up 
Task Force, which appear at pages 295-336 of this book…. The campaign for 
procedural improvement must be waged on many fronts, and the reports of the 
Task Force provide a unique and valuable map of the terrain as well as the 
first practical step, and a highly encouraging one, towards the attainment of 
Agenda 2000 A.D.18
14
 The conference adopted the precise title of Roscoe Pound’s 1906 indictment at the American Bar 
Association’s annual meeting St. Paul, Minnesota. Pound had then criticized the “sporting theory of justice,” “our 
exaggerated contentious procedure,” and “our archaic system of courts.” Pound’s speech was a catalyst for reform 
efforts leading ultimately to the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act and uniform Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, ___ (1987). The 1976 conference, which has come to be known as The 
Pound Conference, symbolically was also held in St. Paul, Minnesota. Chief Justice Burger proudly stated that 
The Pound Conference was addressing the “‘unfinished business’ placed on the American Agenda by Pound’s 
1906 speech. Warren E. Burger, Preface in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE
5, 5 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). See generally Symposium, The Impact of Mediation: 25 
Years After the Pound Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 527-712 (2002).
15
 According to the published list, approximately 60% of the conferees were judges or court administrators; 
fewer than 10% were law professors; and about 15% were various representatives of the American Bar 
Association. Conferees haled from 48 of the 50 states (and also from Puerto Rico and American Samoa). I 
fantasize that the State of Montana was purposely excluded in an effort to spite the legacy of Thomas J. Walsh, 
the noble senator therefrom who for nearly two decades almost single-handedly blocked the adoption of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, ___ (1987). Alas there is probably some stock 
explanation. (West Virginia, too, appears to have had no representative in attendance.)
16
 Robert H. Bork, Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts in THE POUND CONFERENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 150 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (advocating for 
the abolition of diversity jurisdiction); Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts? in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 51 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) 
(inviting the legislative branch to reexamine the possibility of decriminalizing dunkenness, prostitution, and 
gambling); Walter Schaefer, Is the Adversary System Working in Optimal Fashion? in THE POUND CONFERENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 171 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (suggesting that 
trial by jury in civil cases has no contemporary justification); Laura Nader, Commentary in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 114 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) 
(emphasizing the absence of important data).
17
 William T. Gossett et al., Foreword, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE 
FUTURE 7, 15 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). Cf. John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound’s St. Paul 
Address of 1906, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 176, 176 (1936) (crediting Pound’s speech as “the spark that 
kindled the white flame of high endeavor, now spreading through the entire legal profession”).
18
 William T. Gossett, Bernard G. Segal and Chesterfield Smith, Foreword in THE POUND CONFERENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 7, 15 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
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The papers presented at the conference were published in a bound volume 
entitled The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future.19 The 
title’s upbeat and reformist tone is revealing in light of the title of the 
conference itself.20
Professor Frank Sander’s speech at the Pound Conference, entitled 
Varieties of Dispute Processing, envisioned “by the year 2000 not simply a 
court house but a Dispute Resolution Center, where the grievant would first 
be channelled [CQ] through a screening clerk who would then direct him to 
the process (or sequence of processes) most appropriate to his type of 
case.”21 Sander suggested that dispute resolution required a flexible and 
diverse panoply of processes to meet the systematic needs of entire 
categories of certain types of cases and also the unique circumstances 
presented in particular cases.22 Although he did not himself then use the 
phrase “multi-door courthouse,” such is the frequent characterization of his 
ideal.23 Moreover, his remarks are often credited as marking the birth of the 
modern ADR movement.24
The ADR movement found traction because it intertwined threads of the 
political left25 and right,26 responded to a genuine problem within the legal 
19 THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. 
Wheeler eds., 1979).
20
 Query whether Pound’s reforms might have been more warmly embraced and more promptly enacted, had 
the title of his speech “Causes for Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice” enjoyed the benefit 
of such handlers. See generally John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound’s St. Paul Address of 1906: The Spark that 
Kindles the White Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 176 (1937). With regard to the delay, see 
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, ___ (1987).
21
 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON 
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
22 See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON 
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 72-79 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (outlining criteria for 
determining how particular disputes might best be resolved). See also Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of 
Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW & SOC. REV. 217 (1973).
23 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait 
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 331 & nn. 110 & 111 
(1996). Professor Stempel points out that Sander used the term in a subsequent article. Id. (citing Frank E.A 
Sander, The Multi-Door Courthouse, NATIONAL FORUM, Vol. LXIII, No. 4, Fall 1983).
24 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a System of Justice, 
3 NEV. L.J. 289, 289 & n.3 (Winter 2002/2003); Developments, The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1851, 1853 & n.9 (2000); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin’s Grid, 
3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door 
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
297, 309 (1996); E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BUSINESS 3-4, 29 (1996); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: 
Hierarchy and pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5-6 
(1993); Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion—The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform, 8 WINDSOR Y.B. OF 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 269 (1988); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 n.17 (1986).
25 See generally, Ralph Nader, Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements, 11 LAW & 
SOC. REV. 247, 255 (1976) (“The [legal] system must be designed to encourage the non-legal resolution of 
disputes, and public participation in planning processes, as well as more traditional legal activity like litigation.”); 
William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 384-87 (1985); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice, THE ATLANTIC, July 1979 at 25; FORD FOUNDATION, 
MEDIATING SOCIAL CONFLICT 4 (1978) (third-party intervention efforts supported by Ford Foundation include 
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profession,27 and resonated with a changing sociopolitical culture.28
Litigants of all types had a new forum for dispute resolution.29 Courts had 
competition.30 The academy had a new discipline.31 And the rhetoric of 
mediation, arbitration, facilitiation, fact-finding, and conciliation); FORD FOUNDATION, CURRENT INTERESTS OF 
THE FORD FOUNDATION: 1978 AND 1979 6-7 (“The [Ford] Foundation plans to support investigations of new 
ways of settling disputes that may be more equitable, cheaper, and less divisive than the adversary process.”).
26
 Chief Justice Burger and others viewed ADR as a mechanism for lightening the caseload of judges. See, 
e.g, Warren Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276-77 (1982) (advocating private binding 
arbitration as “a better way to do it”); Derek Bok, The President’s Report to the Board of Overseers of Harvard 
College, 1981-1982, reprinted in N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1983, at 8, and N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1983, at 31; Cannon, 
Contentious and Burdensome Litigation: A Need for Alternatives, 63 NAT’L FORUM, Fall 1983, at 10; Ehrlich, 
Legal Pollution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 8, 1976, at 17, 21; Footlick, Too Much Law?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, 
at 42, 47; Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 780 (1977); Rosenberg, Let’s 
Everybody Litigate?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1360-63 (1972); Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, July 1979, at 25. Owen Fiss wrote that Chief Justice Burger was not “moved by love, or by a desire to 
find new ways to restore or preserve loving relationships, but rather by concerns of efficiency and politics. He 
seeks alternatives to litigation in order to reduce the caseload of the judiciary or, even more plausibly, to insulate 
the status quo from reform by the judiciary.” Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985); Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accomplis, Failed 
Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 344 (1996) (“ADR’s biggest boosters 
are commercial organizations, employers, insurers, political conservatives and Republicans.”).
Another reform current bears mention here. The year 1976 also brought the Court’s decision in Mathews v. 
Eldredge, reflecting a certain diminution in the guarantees of due process. See generally Jerry Mashaw, The 
Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in 
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
27 ABA REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINOR DISPUTES RESOLUTION 11-12 (May 1977); 
Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950 (1979).
28
Alternative dispute settlement agencies have emerged, I believe, because there is, in the United States, a 
growing feeling of dissatisfaction with, and a more critical attitude towards, professionals, an increasing 
consciousness that American and Americans must recapture a sense of ‘community,’ and a growing feeling 
that individuals must play a more active role in determining how their lives are to be lived. Mediation centers 
and similar agencies are, to a large extent, a response to these concerns.
David N. Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 209 (1978) 
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (examining 
society’s evolving expectations of courts and judges).
See generally Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much Better 
Than I Thought, 3 Nev. L.J. 196, __ (Winter 2002/2003) (suggesting that the commonality of procedural reform 
movements include: “(1) obvious defects in the existing procedural systems; (2) agendas of the legal profession; 
(3) conservative ideology; and (4) liberal ideology”); Linda R. Singer, A Pioneer’s Perspective: Future Looks 
Bright, But Challenges Include Retaining Our Core Values, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2000, at 26-27 (“The 
[Pound] Conference coalesced the interests of those who focused on access and participation or voice with those 
who focused on costs and efficiency. Those interests have coexisted, somewhat uneasily, in the field ever since 
and have helped to shape the dispute resolution profession that has grown up as a result.”)
29
 For example, the Center for Public Resources (CPR) was founded in 1979 with support from private 
foundations and memberships of in-house and firm counsel of the country’s largest companies. CPR’s mission is 
to promote innovation and excellence in methods of alternative dispute resolution. Approximately 4000 
companies (800 parent companies, on behalf of themselves and their combined 3200 subsidiaries) have subscribed 
to the CPR Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation, obligating them to explore the use of ADR 
in disputes with other signers. Similarly, approximately 1,500 law firms have signed the CPR Law Firm Policy 
Statement on Alternatives to Litigation, committing them to counsel their clients about ADR options. See 
http://www.cpradr.org/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
30
 Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 47-48 
(1987) (exploring the competitive aspects of the relationship between ADR and publicly financed courts”).
ADR was quickly viewed as part of the solution to many categories of cases. See, e.g., Ronald L. Goldfarb 
& Linda R. Singer, Redressing Prisoners’ Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175; Raymond G. Leffler, Dispute 
Settlement Within Close Corporations, 31 ARB. J. (n.s.) 254 (1976); Andrew J. Nocas, Arbitration of Medical 
Malpractice Claims, 13 FORUM 254 (1977); Comment, Nontraditional Remedies for the Settlement of Consumer 
Disputes, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 385 (1976); Symposium, The Value of Arbitration and Mediation in Resolving 
Community and Racial Disputes Affecting Business, 29 BUS. LAW. 1005 (1974); Note, Arbitration of Attorney Fee 
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peaceful problem-solving offered a quixotic escape from all of that which 
plagued formal adjudication.32 At the time of Sander’s speech there already 
existed a broad array of proposed and experimental models of alternative 
dispute resolution33 But Sander elevated these various methods of dispute 
Disputes: New Direction for Professional Responsibility, 5 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 309 (1976); Timothy S. 
Hardy & R. Mason Cargill, Resolving Government Contract Disputes: Why Not Arbitrate?, 34 FED. B.J. 1 (1975); 
Matthew W. Finkin, The Arbitration of Faculty Status Disputes in Higher Education, 30 SW. L.J. 389 (1976).
31 See, e.g., DEAN PRUITT & JEFFREY RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT (1986); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE 
MEDIATION PROCESS (1986); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); GARY BELLOW 
& BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: NEGOTIATION (1981); HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE, 
THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR: PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS (1977); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM C. 
URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); P. H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND 
NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1979); DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981); 
STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1996); 
Carrie Menkel Meadow, Review Essay, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. 
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 905.
See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 
235 (1979); E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN 
THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); E. Allen Lind et 
al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. 
LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1995); Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS 
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26, 38-42 (Kenneth Arrow, Robert H. Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky & Robert 
Wilson eds., 1999).
Of course the new discipline ultimately found its way into the classroom.
Even law schools, until recent years, have provided little or no training in negotiation skills. How strange! 
The lawyer’s major revenue-producing activity is negotiating. Only very recently have such courses begun to 
appear on the curriculum of even the best law schools. Just this year, West Publishing Company added a 
casebook on the subject to its American Casebook Series: The Lawyer as a Negotiator by Professor Harry T. 
Edwards of Harvard and James J. White of Michigan (1977).
Robert Coulson, New Dimensions in Dispute Settlement for the Lawyer in THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION’S WIDE WORLD OF ARBITRATION: AN ANTHOLOGY 188, 189 (Charlotte Gold and Susan 
Mackenzie, eds.) (1978); Robert B. Moberly, Introduction: Dispute Resolution in the Law School Curriculum: 
Opportunities and Challenges, 50 FLA. L. REV. 583, 585-86 (1998) (suggesting that almost all law schools offer 
at least one, and often multiple courses in dispute resolution). Professor Michael Moffitt at the University of 
Oregon School of Law maintains on behalf of the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution a list 
of the dispute resolution course offerings at all American law schools. See http://www.law.uoregon.edu/aba/ (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2004).
Today, of course, there are many excellent casebooks devoted exclusively to these fields of study. See, e.g., 
CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHENIDER & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2004); STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. 
SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND 
OTHER PROCESSES (4th ed. 2003); ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS (3rd ed. 2002); E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. 
HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BUSINESS (1996).
32 See, e.g., Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and 
to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 833-39 (1998) (arguing that 
increased use of mediation may elevate legal practice); see also Frances McGovern, Beyond Efficiency: A Bevy of 
ADR Justifications (An Unfootnoted Summary), DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 12, 13; cf. GABRIEL A. 
ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 1-
10 (1965) (arguing that cultural factors shape political institutions).
33 See Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR: The Earl F. Nelson Memorial Lecture, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 
3, 4 (“Obviously, we didn’t invent mediation, we didn’t invent arbitration. But, by common agreement, it was in 
about 1975 that the current interest in ADR began. The first period, I think, was about 1975 to 1982. I call it, ‘Let 
a thousand flowers bloom.’ There were many experiments….”). ADR mechanisms then in practice included 
neighborhood justice centers, rejuvenated small claims courts, arbitration, mediation, ombudsmen, and even 
reconceptualized state and federal agencies. See Daniel McGillis, Minor Dispute Processing: A Review of Recent 
Developments, in ROMAN TOMASIC & MALCOLM FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN 
EMERGING IDEA 60, 64 (1982) (recounting how, in the 1960s, local communities established neighborhood justice 
centers to provide facilitative dispute resolution services for neighbors, families, tenants, and consumers); DANIEL 
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resolution from their shadowy adjunct and ancillary status to a legitimate 
alternative primary process for the resolution of certain disputes.34 Charting 
a spectrum of available processes from formal adjudication, at one end, 
through mediation and negotiation at the other end, Sander emphasized that 
the critical issue was determining, for a particular conflict, the “appropriate 
dispute resolution process.”35
Notwithstanding a vocal and persistent chorus of disquietude,36 ADR 
has expanded to become something of a court of general civil jurisdiction.37
No longer a niche product for certain commercial and labor law cases,38
MCGILLIS & JOAN MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS (Nat’l 
Inst. L. Enforcement & Crim. Just. No. J-LEAA-030-76, 1977); DAVIS S. GOULD, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR 
CONSUMER JUSTICE, STAFF STUDIES ON SMALL CLAIMS COURTS (1972) (documenting success of small claims 
courts); Thomas L. Eovaldi & Joan E. Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress, 66 NW. U. L. 
REV. 281, 302-12 (1971) (discussing arbitration and mediation of consumer claims); Mary Gardiner Jones & 
Barry B. Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357 (1972) (same); Wexler, Court-Ordered Consumer Arbitration, 28 ARB. J. 175 (1973) 
(same); Maurice Rosenberg & Myra Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in 
Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1961) (same); George King, The Consumer Ombudsman, 79 COM. L.J. 355 
(1974) (__); Eric H. Steele, Fraud, Dispute, and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1107 (1975) (__); David A. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer 
Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1968) (__); NATIONAL ASSOC. OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMM. 
ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 4-5 (1973) (__); 
Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that are Civil to Promote Justice that is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV.
797 (1971) (___); Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal 
Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973).
See generally E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BUSINESS 29 (1996) (suggesting that ADR is “Not a new or even recent development,” 
and citing decision of King Solomon, Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, and use of arbitration and mediation to 
resolve trade and labor disputes). See also n. __, supra.
34
 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON 
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 80 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
35
 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON 
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). 
Commentators have since adopted this appellation of the “ADR” acronym. See, e.g., Albie M. Davis & 
Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the Old-Fashioned Way—We Earn It!, 4 NEGOT. J. 55, 62 (1988); 
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 6 at n.* (4th ed. 2003); Janet Reno, Lawyers as 
Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 8 (1999) (urging lawyers to engage in 
“appropriate dispute resolution”); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND 
LAWYERS 51 (2d ed. 1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2689-90 (1995) (urging that appropriate 
should replace alternative in describing mediation and other nontrial dispute resolution processes). Of all the 
credit heaped upon Professor Sander for his 1976 speech, I find it surprising that he has not also justly received 
the credit for inventing the term “appropriate dispute resolution.” In any event, upon my reading of the tea leaves 
and the contemporary scholarship, it appears that “CDR” (“complementary dispute resolution”) is the next 
iteration. See n. __ infra and accompanying text.
36
 The bibliographies cited in n. __, infra, collect the relevant sources.
37 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1997) (noting that arbitration has “moved from the role of commercial court to that of a civil court of 
general jurisdiction.”). See also Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and Death of 
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 186 (2003) (suggesting that ADR has “creat[ed] a ‘new’ civil 
procedure”).
38 See, e.g., GABRIEL M. WILNER, 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3 (1999); Christine Lepera & 
Jeannie Costello, New Areas in ADR, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: WHAT THE BUSINESS LAWYER 
NEEDS TO KNOW 593, 610 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-605, 1999). Employers 
are attracted to ADR for its facilitation of preventive management. See, e.g., John E. Sands & Sam Margulies, 
ADR in Employment Law: The Concept of Zero Litigation, N.J. LAW., Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 23, 23-24 (discussing 
the fit between “new” management structures and ADR in addressing employment-related conflicts).
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ADR now commands attention in all sectors of the economy39 and in 
virtually every segment of society.40
39
 In a 1997 Price Waterhouse survey of the “Fortune 1000” companies, nearly all of the 530 respondents 
had used some form of ADR, and ninety percent classified ADR as a “critical cost control technique.” Jack M. 
Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1301 (1998). For a detailed report on corporate use of ADR, see David B. 
Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J. Feb. 1999, at 66, 66-71.
A review of recent literature indicates the expansion of ADR in antitrust, see, e.g., Howard Adler, Jr. & 
Richard Chernick, The Expanding Role of ADR in Antitrust Cases, 9 No. 2 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 34 (Winter 2003); 
entertainment, see, e.g., Symposium, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Entertainment Industry, 4 CARDOZO 
ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1-___ (October 23, 2002); Peter A. Carfagna, “Show Me the Money:” In Lucrative 
Sports Contracts, an ADR Clause Makes All the Difference, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 9 (2002); MARGERY HOLMAN, 
DICK MORIARTY & JANICE FORSYTH, SPORTS, FITNESS AND THE LAW: NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES __-__ 
(2nd ed. 2001) (chapter on ADR in Sports Law); Gerald F. Phillips, Entertainment Industry is Accepting ADR, 21 
No. 1 ENT. L. REP. 5 (1999); health care, see, e.g., Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life 
Decision-Making I, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (2004); Phyllis E. Bernard, Mediating With an 800-Pound 
gorilla: Medicare and ADR, 60 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1417 (2003); John W. Cooley, A Dose of ADR for the 
Health Care Industry, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 16 (Feb.-Apr. 2002); Bryan A. Lian, ADR in Health Care: An Overview 
of the ADR Landscape in HEALTH CARE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MANUAL 3:1 – 3:43 (2000); construction, see, e.g., 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOC. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (INCLUDING 
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES) (2000); CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CPR MODEL ADR 
PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ADR (1994); HIBBERD & NEWMAN, ADR AND 
ADJUDICATION IN CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES (1999); natural resources, see, e.g., Eileen B. Vernon, Arbitration in 
the Energy/Minerals Field: Customizing the Clause, 56-J AN DISP. RESOL. J. 50 (Nov. 2001/Jan. 2002); P. Jean 
Baker, ADR Assists Energy Industry Restructuring, DISP. RESOL. J. 9 (Feb. 1999); intellectual property, see, e.g., 
Manny D. Pokotilow, Why Alternative Dispute Resolution Should be Used for Intellectual Property Disputes, 16 
No. 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 17 (July 2004); Kevin M. Lemley, I’ll Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: A 
Proposed Model for Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 AKRON L. REV. 287 
(2004); Rodney C. Kyle, Arbitration Makes Sense in International Intellectual Property Disputes, 56-J AN DISP. 
RESOL. J. 30 (Nov. 2001/Jan. 2002); Scott H. Blackman & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
in Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1716 (1998) (arguing that ADR is an 
effective means of resolving disputes that involve “shared rights” and for which an “either/or result in which one 
party walks away with all the rights at issue” is ill-suited); Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Using Alternative Dispute 
Resolution to Resolve Patent Litigation: A Survey of Patent Litigators, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 77, 84 
(1999); telecommunications, see, e.g., Lori Tripoli, Telecommunications Act Offers Opportunity for ADR 
Advocates, INSIDE LITIG., Mar. 1997, at 3, 3 (reporting that the CPR Institute’s Telecommunications Group is 
recommending ADR to state agencies that must implement the Telecommunications Act of 1996); and technology 
industries, see, e.g., William F. Baron, High- Tech/High Resolution: ADR in Technology Disputes, DISP. RESOL. 
J., Apr. 1996, at 88, 90 (noting characteristics of ADR amenable to technology disputes).
Not surprisingly, certain of these growth areas have proven especially controversial. See, e.g., Clyde W. 
Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 685 (2004); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: 
A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Sarah R. Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does 
Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759 (2001); Sidney Charlotte Reynolds, Closing a Discrimination 
Loophole: Using Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision to Prevent Employers from Requiring Unlawful 
Arbitration Agreements as Conditions of Continued Employment, 76 WASH. L. REV. 957 (__); Ronald Turner, 
Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the 
Individual Worker’s Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135 (2000); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment 
of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.REV. 1 (1997); Michael D. Donovan 
& David A. Searles, Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How to Combat Overreaching Arbitration 
Clauses, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 269 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in 
Alternative Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19 (1999).
40
 The Better Business Bureau, for example, may be the most familiar dispute resolution program. See __ 
KING & __ MCEVOY, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE COMPLAINT-HANDLING PROCEDURES USED BY CONSUMERS
(1976) (Nat’l Technical Information Serv., U.S. Commerce Dep’t) (finding the Better Business Bureau more 
familiar to consumers than 19 of 21 public and private organizations; only the Post Office and the Social Security 
Administration were better known). Trade associations and county, city and state-sponsored consumer affairs 
offices also often offer dispute resolution services. See generally Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of 
Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1003- 04 & n.25 (1978-1979).
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has formed special panels from time to time to deal with 
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ADR has clearly arrived in a big way. Many, if not most, federal and state 
jurisdictions include ADR methods in their court rules. Federal and state 
administrative agencies are increasingly relying on non-litigious methods to 
resolve disputes. More and more, disputants are required to use mediation or 
another form of ADR, rather than just being offered the opportunity to use it if 
they so desire. Today, it is clear that far more disputes in the United States are 
resolved through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration than through trial.41
Providing ADR has, itself, become a cottage industry.42 And in cyberspace, 
disputes are resolved through ADR43—even if we have yet to appreciate 
particular phenomena: forming a claims resolution program at the request of the Florida Department of Insurance 
following the devastation of southern Florida by Hurricane Andrew in 1992; constituting a National Technology 
Panel in 1998 to address issues arising from the “Y2K Problem” which then loomed as a potential threat; 
establishing in 2000 a panel for the USA Track and Field doping arbitration program. AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC SERVICE AT THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 8-9 (2004). Other arbitration panels of 
general interest may include the Tribunal Arbitral du Sport, which recently adjudicated the Olympic medal 
controversy between gymnasts Paul Hamm and Yang Tae Young. See http://www.tas-cas.org/ (CAS 2004/A/704 
Yang Tae Young v. International Gymnastics Federation) (last visited November 10, 2004). 
Perhaps the largest effort at private dispute resolution was the formation of the Asbestos Claims Facility. 
This was an entity created with the assistance of Dean Emeritus Harry Wellington, on behalf of manufacturers of 
asbestos and their insurers , to facilitate prompt disputes between and among producers and insurers. See 
generally Harry Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of A Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 
(1984-85); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted 
or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1. 14 & n.56 (1991); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, 
Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 438 (1986) (suggesting 
optimism at early stages of program).
For a range of other social applications of ADR, see, e.g., T. Nikki Eckland, The Safe Schools Act: Legal 
and ADR Responses to Violence in Schools, 31 URB. LAW. 309 321-22 (1999); Nathan K. DeDino, Note, When 
Fences Aren’t Enough: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve Disputes Between Neighbors, 18 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 887 (2003); Scott E. Mollen, Alternative Dispute Resolution of Condominium and 
Cooperative Conflicts, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 75 (1999).
41
 Jean R. Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. 
L.J. 289, 290-91 (Winter 2002/2003) (citing The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-
58, 652(a) (requiring each district court to have litigants in all civil cases consider using ADR, and to provide at 
least one ADR process to litigants); NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY 
PRACTICE app. B (1999 & Supp. 2000) (listing territory, state, and federal legislation on mediation); Jeffrey M. 
Senger, Turning the Ship of State, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 79 (listing federal agencies utilizing various ADR 
processes, including the U.S. Postal Service, federal Justice Department, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, and the Air Force); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339, 1340-41).
Arbitration is sweeping across the American legal landscape and is fundamentally reshaping the manner in 
which disputes are resolved in our legal system. Simply stated, arbitration is everywhere. Virtually all 
American businesses and individuals with legal capacity to contract (and some who clearly lack such 
capacity) have entered into agreements that specify arbitration as the forum for resolving most or all disputes 
that might arise between the parties.”
Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 497, 499 (2004).
42
 A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 248 
(1985); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1301 (1998); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, 
DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 33-62 (1996).
43 See generally Aashit Shah, Using ADR to Resolve Online Disputes, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25 (2004); 
COLIN RULE, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BUSINESS (2002); Frank A. Cona, Focus on Cyberlaw: 
Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 975 (1997); Richard Michael 
Victorio, Internet Dispute Resolution (iDR): Bringing ADR into the 21st Century, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 279 
(2001); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 675 (2000); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet 
Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151 (2000); Joseph W. Goodman, The Pros and Cons of Online 
Dispute Resolution: An Assessment of Cyber-Mediation Websites, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4 (2003).
The Center for Information Technology and Dispute Resolution (CITDR) at the University of Massachusetts 
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fully what and where cyberspace is.44 The increasing incidence of 
transnational disputes has likewise fueled the ADR boom.45
Reference to a system of ADR could be misleading in its simplicity 
since there is, in fact, a constellation of different ADR mechanisms that can 
vary dramatically in form, substance and purpose.46 Generally speaking, 
however, I draw conclusions based on the similarities of those mechanisms 
rather than their differences.47 As Professor Resnik described in a similar 
context, “I am interested in the interaction of two generic modes of dispute 
resolution, one styled ‘adjudication’ and one styled ‘alternative dispute 
resolution’—even as we know that both are constructs, with internal 
distinctions, a variety of expressions, and a good deal of overlap.”48 At this 
initial stage in my argument, then, I am content to have simply outlined the 
supports and sustains the development of information technology applications as a means for better understanding 
and managing conflict. As part of this effort they maintain a list of profit and nonprofit ADR projects and ventures 
that provide online dispute resolution services. As of October 19, 2004, over 50 projects were enumerated. See 
http://www.ombuds.org/center/onlineadr.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). See also //www.odr.info/providers.php 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
44 See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998); David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Paul 
Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as 
Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 447-48 (2003).
45 See, e.g., First Global Research Facility Dedicated to ADR Launched, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1999, at 4, 4; 
Betty Southard Murphy, ADR’s Impact on International Commerce, DISP. RESOL. J., Dec. 1993, at 68, 69. 
Because some foreign courts refuse to hear technology and Internet cases, ADR is the only recourse in these 
situations. See Lepera & Costello, supra note __, at 600. 
Researchers report widespread dissatisfaction among Mexican and Canadian disputants, with more than 50 
sets of laws that must be managed in U.S. litigation, and indicate that the availability of ADR has significantly 
improved the international free trade climate. Mediation is also more compatible with cultural biases in Canada 
and Mexico against litigation. See L. Richard Freese, Jr. & Robert Sagnola, New Challenges in International 
Commercial Disputes: ADR Under NAFTA, COLO. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 61, 62.
46 See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 4-5 (4th ed. 2003) (offering a useful 
table comparing and contrasting various methods of dispute resolution, including arbitration, mediation, 
negotiation, private judging, neutral expert fact-finding, minitrial, ombudsman, and summary jury trial); see also 
id. at 287-94 (describing various innovative forms of arbitration, including final offer arbitration, high-low 
arbitration, and mediation-arbitration (“med-arb”)); id. at 303-04 (discussing early neutral evaluation); Cary 
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rule-Making, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 
(1997) (evaluating regulation negotiation (“reg-neg”)).
For extensive bibliographies describing and evaluating the myriad processes and implications of ADR, see 
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 691-755, 761-82 (4th ed. 2003); ALAN SCOTT 
RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
1007-18 (3rd ed. 2002)
47 See generally, __, Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979) (“‘Alternative dispute resolution’ is a 
label ascribed to an increasingly broad range of options that share few characteristics aside from their common 
departure from traditional courtroom procedures.”). 
There are occasions where distinctions are necessary. See, e.g., nn. ___, infra, and accompanying text.
Of course one should also note that the form, substance and processes of “formal adjudication” can also 
vary. Consider, for example, the differences between small claims court and the United States Supreme Court. See 
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN 
THE FUTURE 65, 69-70 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
48
 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 256 (1995) (citing: Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 Ind. 
L. Rev. 891, 895-96 (1993) (the “privatization continuum”); Galanter & Lande, supra, at 399-400 (charting the 
“dimensions of privatization”)).
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emergence of a system of ADR that is resolving many types of disputes, 
and in large numbers.
II.  THE ECHOES OF EQUITY IN ADR
In its most ambitious form, ADR presents an alternative paradigm of 
dispute resolution. ADR proponents espouse a larger and less traditional 
view of lawyering skills, criticize the physical and financial barriers to 
justice, and focus attention upon the drawbacks of the judicial process—the 
needless complication of issues, the unidimensional character of adversarial 
representation, the excessive costs and delays, and the sporting theory of 
justice.49 They envision a complete restructuring of the adjudicatory 
framework and a reeducation not only of lawyers and other professionals, 
but also of the general public about the ideals of justice and the methods of 
dispute resolution.50
This Part draws attention to the characteristics of equity that inhere in 
that alternative system of ADR. To be sure, comparing two regimes as 
protean and multi-dimensional as equity and ADR without over-
generalizing or caricaturing either, and without cherry-picking the best 
analogues and avoiding the complexities, can be difficult. I have attempted 
to minimize those risks by focusing here on abstractions of the two systems 
rather than on either system’s constituent parts. For the most part these 
abstractions also consider the systems of ADR and Equity in their pure, 
original forms.51 The observations made in this Part are purposely 
uncritical, if not somewhat superficial. A more thorough analysis of the 
relationships between and among the systems of ADR and formal 
adjudication, on one hand, and the systems of Law and Equity, on the other, 
follows in subsequent Parts. That later discussion also addresses the 
evolution and perversion of these analogous “alternative” systems.
A.  Locating a Jurisprudence
As a threshold matter, the word equity requires clarification. There are 
at least three definitions of equity and, to some extent, all are implicated 
here. One popular meaning of equity invokes a collection of eternal and 
universal principles that captures all that which is moral, right, just and 
49 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND 
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 4 (1989); Thomas E. Carbonneau, A Consideration of Alternatives to Divorce 
Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 606-07, 612-15.
50 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND 
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 4 (1989).
51
 Moreover, mining the history of Equity relies heavily on incomplete pictures painted by secondary 
sources, making all conclusions somewhat tentative. .See generally JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO 
BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (Oxford 2001).
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good.52 In the broadest understanding of this view, equity is ethical rather 
than jural.53 Grounded in the precepts of the conscience, this notion of 
equity includes such mandates as gratitude, kindness, and charity, and thus 
extends well beyond the reach of positive law.54
A second, similar meaning sometimes given to equity makes equity 
synonymous with “natural law.” 55 In this view equity is the soul and spirit 
of all law56—the moral standard to which all law should conform.57 In this 
sense equity, the “real law,”58 has a place in every rational system of 
jurisprudence, if not in name, at least in substance.59
52 See generally Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of “Equity” (Epiekia), 18 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 119 (1942-1943); MAX HAMBRUGER, MORALS AND LAW: THE GROWTH OF ARISTOTLE’S LEGAL THEORY 
(1965); NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF VIRTUE (1989).
Interestingly, this definition of equity has slowly fallen out of contemporary discourse. Compare BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 634 (4th ed. 1951) with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 484-85 (5 th ed. 1979); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1980); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 579-
80 (8th ed. 2004).
53 NORMAN FETTER, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1-2 (1895).
54 JOSIAH W. SMITH, A MANUAL OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 3-4 (1st American Edition from the 9th London 
Edition 1871).
55 See Walter Wheeler Cook, Equity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 582 (1931) (“The most 
common of the non-technical meanings of equity, one in which lawyers themselves not infrequently use the word, 
is as a synonym for ‘natural justice.’”)
56
 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES..   . p. 429. It is with this meaning of the word that French 
jurists have said: “L’equité est l’esprit de nos lois”; and a Roman jurist said “Æquitas est honestas.”
57
 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 45 at 45-46 (2d ed. 1892); 
58
 Joseph H. Beale, Equity in America, 1 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 25 (“[T]he doctrines of equity represent the 
real law, and when a Court of law insists on applying its own views as against the views of equity, it is not getting 
at the real substantial rights of the parties.”).
59 See “1 FONBLANGUE EQUITY, B. 1, § 3, p.24, note (h); PLOWDEN, COMM. p. 465, 466. Lord Bacon said in 
his Argument on the jurisdiction of the Marches, there is no law under heaven which is not supplied with equity; 
for summum jus summar injuria; or as some have it, summa lex summa crux. And, therefore, all nations have 
equity. 4 BAC. WORKS, p. 274. Plowden, in his note to his Reports, dwells much (p. 465, 466) on the nature of 
equity in the interpretation of statutes, saying, Ratio legis est anima legis. And it is a common maxim in the law of 
England, that Apices juris non sunt jura BRANCH’S MAXIMS, p. 12; CO. LITT. 304(b).” 1 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 7 at 6 (12th ed. 1877).
This definition of equity has led some to focus on the commonality of the foundational principles of the 
common law and equity. Thus, Blackstone says: “The [common] law is the perfection of reason; it always intends 
to conform thereto; and what is not reason is not law.” He then goes on to say: “Not that the particular reason of 
every rule in the law can at this distance of time be always precisely assigned; but it is sufficient that there be 
nothing in the rule flatly contradictory to reason, and then the law will presume it to be well founded.” 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON …  p. 70.
The moral law, as such, is not an element of the human law. Whatever be the name under which it is 
described,—the moral law, the natural law, the law of nature, the principles of right and justice,—this code 
which is of divine origin, and which is undoubtedly compulsory upon all mankind in their personal relations, 
is not per se or ex proprio vigore a part of the positive jurisprudence which, under the name of the municipal 
law, each independent state has set for the government of its own body politic. This truth, so simple and so 
plain, and yet so often forgotten by text-writers and judges, removes at once all doubt and difficulty from a 
clear conception of the positive human law, and of its relations with the higher and divine law which we call 
morality. Speculative writers upon the natural law may well see in it the foundation of all perfected human 
legislation, and it is not surprising that they should confound the two. It is surprising that those who treat of 
the human jurisprudence alone, and especially those who administer that jurisprudence, should confound the 
commands uttered by the divine Law-giver with those issued by human law-makers. It is true that many of the 
precepts of this moral code relate to mankind considered as members of an organized society,—the state,—
and prescribe the obligations which belong to them as component parts of a national body; and therefore these 
precepts are jural in their nature and design, and the duties which they impose upon individuals are of the 
same kind as those imposed by the human authority of the state. It is also true that human legislation ought to 
conform itself to and embody these jural precepts of the moral code; every legislator, whether he legislate in a 
Parliament or on the judicial bench, ought to find the source and material of the rules he lays down in these 
principles of morality; and it is certain that the progress toward a perfection of development in every 
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A third, technical definition of Equity (a meaning typically signified by 
use of the capital letter “E”) refers to that system of jurisprudence that was 
originally administered by the High Court of Chancery in England.60 The 
circularity of this definition requires a brief narration of the scope of the 
jurisprudence of Equity.
The system of Equity evolved from the royal prerogative of kings, as the 
fountainhead of justice,61 to ensure that justice was administered in each 
municipal law consists in its gradually throwing off what is arbitrary, formal, and unjust, and its adopting 
instead those rules and doctrines which are in agreement with the eternal principles of right and morality. But 
it is no less true that until this work of legislation has been done, until the human law-giver has thus borrowed 
the rules of morality, and embodied them into the municipal jurisprudence by giving them a human sanction, 
morality is not binding upon the citizens of a state as a part of the law of that state. In every existing 
municipal law belonging to a civilized nation, this work of adaptation and incorporation has been performed 
to a greater or less degree.
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 63 at 65-67 (2d ed. 1892).
60 See n. __, infra.
Equity Jurisprudence, in the specific and technical sense of the term, as contradistinguished from natural, 
abstract, and universal Equity, and from Law and the Statutory Jurisprudence of the Court of Chancery, may 
be described to be a portion of justice or natural Equity, not embodied in legislative enactments or in the rules 
of the Common law, yet modified by a due regard thereto, and to the complex relations and convenience of an 
artificial state of society, and administered in regard to cases where the particular rights in respect whereof 
relief is sought come within some general class of rights enforced at Law, or may be enforced without 
detriment or inconvenience to the community, but where, as to such particular rights, the Courts of Law 
cannot, or originally did not, clearly afford any relief or adequate relief, at least not without circuity of action 
or multiplicity of suits, or cannot make such restrictions, adjustments, compensations, qualifications, or 
conditions, as may be necessary in order to take due care of the rights of all who are interested in the property 
in litigation.
JOSIAH W. SMITH, A MANUAL OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 2-3 (1st American Ed. from the 9th London Ed. 1871). 
See also 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 67 AT 70-71 (2d ed. 1892) 
(defining equity as “those doctrines and rules, primary and remedial rights and remedies, which the common law, 
by reason of its fixed methods and remedial system, was either unable or inadequate in the regular course of its 
development, to establish, enforce, and confer, and which it therefore either tacitly omitted or openly rejected”); 
MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF EQUITY 9 (1879) (“The jurisdiction of courts of chancery now extends to 
all civil cases proper in good conscience and honesty for relief or aid as to which the procedure of the common-
law courts is unsuited to give an adequate remedy, or as to which the common-law courts, when able to extend 
their aid, have refused to do so.”); CHARLES E. PHELPS, JURIDICAL EQUITY 192 (1894) (“By juridical equity is 
meant a systematic appeal fro relief from a cramped administration of defective laws to the disciplined conscience 
of a competent magistrate, applying to the special circumstances of defined and limited classes of civil cases the 
principles of natural justice, controlled in a measure as well by considerations of public policy as by established 
precedent and by positive provisions of law.”); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: 
AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 25 AT 18 (12th ed. 1877) (“[E]quity jurisprudence may … 
properly be said to be that portion of remedial justice, which is exclusively administered by a court of equity, as 
contradistinguished from that portion of remedial justice, which is exclusively administered by a court of common 
law.”); GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 
ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 1 (11th ed. 1931) (1874) (“[equity] is that system of justice which was 
administered by the high court of chancery in England in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction.”); Howard 
L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 24 (1951) (“The description of 
equity as that law which was administered by the old English courts of Chancery, of course, is hardly a definition. 
Yet that is the customary introductory description of equity.”).
61
 The king is accordingly both the chosen head of the nation and the lord paramount of the whole land; he is 
the source of justice and the ultimate resource in appeal for such equity as he is pleased to dispense; the 
supreme judge of his own necessities and the methods to supply them. He is in fact despotic, for there is no 
force that can constitutionally control him, or force him to observe conditions to which, for his own security 
or for the regular dispatch of business, he may have been pleased to pledge himself.
STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY § 118 at ___ (___). See also Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity 
Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 33 (1951); W__ WALSH, EQUITY c. 1 (1930); George Burton Adams, 
The Origin of English Equity, 16 COL. L. REV. 87, 89 (1916); __ TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 91-3, 133 
(1937); Bracton, De Legibus, etc., II, ch. 9, 107 b; ch. 10, fol. 108, V; ch. 15, fol. 412, 1, 2, 3. Warren B. Kittle, 
Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21, 23 (1919-1920); Colin P. 
Campbell, The Court of Equity, 15 GREEN BAG 108, 109 (1903); Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—
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case.62 The Chancellor, who functioned as a secretary to the king and also 
as the keeper of the king’s seal and “conscience” administered the king’s 
justice by issuing, at his discretion, brevia or writs commanding the 
performance or cessation of certain acts.63 The repeated issuance of writs 
based upon similar circumstances led to a standardization of that process, 
such that the Chancellor’s court could issue the appropriate writ whenever a 
complainant presented a certain pattern of facts.64 These writs became the 
foundation of the “common law.”65 To the king’s court were added, in turn, 
the court of the Exchequer, the court of Common Pleas, and the court of the 
King’s Bench—all common law courts, 66 and all approachable only upon 
the authority of a writ issued by the Chancery.67
Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21, 21 (1919-1920); Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth 
Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 89 (1934); See Warren B. Kittle, Courts of 
Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21, 23 (1919-1920) (“It was the firm 
policy of the Norman kings to concentrate all power within themselves.”); 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & 
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 85-87 (1895); D.M. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL 
SKETCH OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 13-14 (1890). The operative principle was that the 
king was the fountainhead of all justice, and in him, resided the final power to do whatever was just and righteous. 
See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 12–13 
(1952); WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 69–70 (1923).
62
. Until the latter part of the twelfth century, ordinary law and justice in England was governed by custom 
and was administered rather informally (if not crudely) by the shire courts and the courts of the hundred motes (in 
the time of Saxons and Danes, dating back to the seventh century) and by the county, borough and manor courts 
(in the early Norman period beginning with the Norman Conquest in 1066). The forms of trial were, in large part, 
appeals to the supernatural. See generally 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 14-22 (1895); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 40 (7th
ed. 1956); GEORGE L. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3 (1948); George Burton Adams, The Origin of English 
Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 91 & n.10 (1916) (discussing the king’s “prerogative machinery”); Frederick 
Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest 14 L.Q. REV. 291, 297 (1898). 
63
. See George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COL. L. REV. 87, 89 (1916) (discussing the 
new “judicial machinery” brought into England at the Norman Conquest); Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, 
Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760 (1945) (“Justice did open the door, of course, 
and it was the royal hand that was on the knob.”); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF 
ACTION, 4–5 (Chaytor ed. 1909).
64 This development is generally credited to Henry II (Curtmantle), who reigned from 1154–1189. See 
JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (4th ed. 2002); 1 SIR FREDERICK 
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 138-46 (1895); WILLIAM F. 
WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 2 (1930).
65 See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 49 (4th ed. 2002); WILLIAM F. 
WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 86-88 (1930); 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 129-30 (1895); See also JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, COMMON LAW 
PLEADING 18 (1969) (“Substantive law grew out of procedure. Courts were organized to handle a series of 
specific cases, the division of which gradually developed theories of rights and liabilities. Our rights and liabilities 
as defined by substantive law, then, had their origin in and developed out of procedural law.”). Of course, it bears 
emphasis that the rights that were recognized were almost exclusively property rights; there were no personal 
rights, political rights, civil rights as we understand them. See William Q. deFuniak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 
23 TUL. L. REV. 54, 56 (1948-1949).
66
 Although each of these courts initially had its own proper sphere, these distinctions faded. Generally 
speaking, plaintiffs had a choice between the three courts, and each of them dealt with the case in the same way 
and by the same rules. These courts administered traditional law and statutes. The phrase “common law” was 
borrowed from the canonists—who used jus commune to denote the general law of the Catholic Church. The 
common law refers to that part of the law that is unenacted and non-statutory yet common to the whole land and 
to all Englishmen. It is contrasted with statute, local custom, and the royal prerogative. When Chancery courts 
developed, common law would also be contrasted with equity. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO 
THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (1909).
67
 Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 35- 36 (1951).
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But the common law system became a hard and fast system with certain 
clearly defined things which it could do and with equally clearly defined 
things which it could not do.68 The universe of writs was fixed and their 
construction by law judges narrowly circumscribed;69 precise and technical 
rules of pleading, procedure and proof cabined judicial discretion within the 
form of action.70 And even for those who could navigate the procedural 
minutiae successfully, the remedies which the law courts gave were often 
wholly inadequate.71
68
 This statement requires some qualification. There is evidence that, in fact, the early “law courts” of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries enjoyed and exercised considerable discretion in the administration of what we 
would later be called law and equity. Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244, 
246 (1945); H.D. Hazeltine, The Early History of English Equity in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY 261 (Paul 
Vinogradoff, ed. 1913); William Searle Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law 
Judges to the Equity Administered by the Chancellor, 26 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1916) (accumulating evidence that 
common law judges in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries “administered both law and equity”); Aaron 
Friedberg, The Merger of Law and Equity, 12 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 317, 318 n.2 (1938) (“during the reign of Henry 
II, both equity and common law were administered under the same system of procedure and were quite 
undistinguishable from each other”).The ossification soon followed, however. See George Burton Adams, The 
Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 96 (1916). See also William Q. deFuniak, Origin and Nature of 
Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54, 57 (1948-1949) (“A growing worship of formalism and technicality also began to 
obsess the courts of law.”).
69
. For example, a provision in Magna Charta (1215) significantly diminished the scope of the royal writ in 
respect to titles to land. Also, the Provisions of Oxford (1258) expressly forbade the Chancellor to issue any new 
writs “without the commandment of the King and his council who shall be present.” The Provisions were annulled 
five years later, but the common law courts nevertheless were transformed during the 13th century into a rigid 
system of formal actions. See 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 196 (7th ed. 1956); 
2 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 291 (7th ed. 1956); ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 (1952) (citing FREDERIC WILLIAM 
MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION 41 (1936); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
58-59 (7th ed. 1956)). Later, in the reign of Edward the First (1272-1307), Chancery was empowered to issue new 
writs to deal with new situations, but met resistance from the common law courts which could, and often did, 
throw out the writ as unlawful. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 23, __ (1951). This coincides with the development of the common law courts into an institution that was 
separate from the king. See Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244, 246 
(1945) (noting independence of common law courts as of the fourteenth century); William Searle Holdsworth, The 
Early History of Equity, 13 MICH. L. REV. 293, 294 (1915) (“In the latter half of the 14th and in the 15th centuries 
the common law tended to become a fixed and rigid system. It tended to be less closely connected with the king, 
and therefore less connected with, and sometimes even opposed to, the exercise of . . . royal discretion.”).
70
. See Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 10, 10-11 
(1926)(“In accordance with its technical mode of procedure, every species of legal wrong was supposed to fit into 
some one of a limited number of classes; for each class an appropriate remedy was provided, obtainable only by 
the use of some one of a limited number of ‘forms of action.’ An action was begun by the issuance of a writ 
appropriate to the form of action; in time these writs became standardized, and, where the facts of a case were 
without precedent, no writ to cover them was found, and hence no action could be brought.”); George Palmer 
Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 30, 31 (1924-1925) (discussing “form-mad common lawyers”); 
JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 61–62 (1913) 
(referring to the common law’s “formulaic procedure”); William Searle Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity 
Administered by the Common Law Judges to the Equity Administered by the Chancellor, 26 YALE L.J. 1, 22 
(1916) (discussing the “complicated machinery” of the law courts).
71
. See ELIAS MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 17 (1895) (discussing inability 
of common law courts to compel the performance of duties); Warren B. Kittle, Courts of law and Equity—Why 
They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21, 28 (1919-1920) (“[T]he remedies which the law courts gave 
were often wholly inadequate. They were as bad as no remedy at all.”).
We are thus faced with the startling view of a system of so-called jurisprudence that can interpose only after a 
wrong has been done and is impotent to stay the hand of the wrongdoer; which is powerless to compel men to 
perform their obligations and can only give damages for their nonperformance; and which cannot take of or 
repair the mistakes or omissions that so frequently arise in business affairs. In short, a system of jurisprudence 
grossly imperfect and deficient.
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The ossification of the common law made it impossible for many 
petitioners to obtain writs appropriate to their peculiar problems. Without 
appropriate writs, they could obtain no adequate redress from the common 
law courts.72 Yet there remained the royal prerogative.73 Chancery, which 
was under the influence of ecclesiastical Chancellors who had some 
acquaintance with the aequitas of Roman law and also knowledge of canon 
law, ushered in the next stage of development in English law.74
The early ecclesiastical Chancellors thought that it was consistent with belief 
in a revealed Word which stressed, among other things, a golden rule, for 
them to translate moral and ethical rights into juridical rights, enforced by the 
State, through its tribunals, when it was reasonable thus to summon political 
sovereignty to the aid of morals, and when the violation of such ethical rights 
involved proprietary consequences affecting the common good.75
By the late fourteenth century, a separate Court of Chancery administered 
this jurisprudence.76 To minimize its conflict with the common law courts, 
William Q. de Funiak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54, 57 (1948-1949) (citing MERWIN, 
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 17 (1895)).
72
 Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 36 (1951).
73 FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION at 3 (Chaytor ed. 1909) (“Though 
these great courts of law have been established (King’s Bench, Common Pleas, etc.) there is still a reserve of 
justice in the king.”).
74 See Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 312 (1933); Garrard Glenn & Kenneth 
Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760–61 (1945). According to Professor 
Glenn, much pomp accompanied the early chancellors when they marched in state. A graphic description appears 
in GEORGE CAVENDISH, THE LIFE OF THOMAS WOLSEY (1893), which was written by a gentleman usher of a 
chancellor. See also Walter E. Sparks, The Origin, Growth, and Present Scope of Equity Jurisprudence in 
England and the United States, 16 W. JURIST 473, 475 (1882) (“From the time of the reign of Henry VI 
[chancery] constantly grew in importance, and in the reign of Henry VII it expanded into a broad and almost 
boundless jurisdiction under the fostering care and ambitious wisdom and the love of power of Cardinal 
Wolsey.”).
75
 Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke and the Science of Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319, 321 
n.10 (1935-1936).
76 See Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 10, 11 (1926) 
(the “practice of referring to the Chancellor all of these special appeals to the kind led to the establishment of a 
tribunal which by the time of Edward III (1327–1377) had become recognized as a distinct and permanent court, 
with its separate jurisdiction and mode of procedure and its seat at Westminster”); William Searle Holdsworth, 
The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges to the Equity Administered by the 
Chancellor, 26 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1916) (describing that all cases which called for equity were “handed over to a 
tribunal which, in time, came to be perfectly distinct from any of the common law courts”); William F. Walsh, 
Equity Prior to the Chancellor’s Court, 17 GEO. L.J. 97, 107 (1928-1929) (suggesting that Chancery as a court of 
equity was taking form “around the 14th century”); George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COL. 
L. REV. 87, 97 (1916) (dating origins of a separate system of equity to the fourteenth century); George Burton 
Adams, The Continuity of English Equity, 26 YALE L.J. 550, 556 n.17 (1917) (“The chancellor’s court had 
become distinct from the Council before the end of the 15th century.”); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 404 (7th ed. 1956) (suggesting that the Chancellor first made a decree on his own 
authority in 1474); Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 
96 (1934) (“It was not until the end of the fifteenth century that purely equity matters go to the chancellor 
alone.”); Walter E. Sparks, The Origin, Growth, and Present Scope of Equity Jurisprudence in England and the 
United States, 16 W. JURIST 473, 474 (1882) (quoting the proclamation of 22 Edward III addressed to the sheriffs 
of London “commanding them that, whatsoever business relating as well to the common law of our kingdom, as 
our special grace, cognizable before us, from henceforth to be prosecuted as followeth; viz., The common law 
business before the Archbishop of Canterbury, elect, our chancellor, by him to be dispatched, and the other 
matters grantable by our special grace be prosecuted before our special chancellor, or our well beloved clerk, the 
keeper of the privy seal, so that they, or one of them, transmit to us such petitions of business which, without 
consulting us, they cannot determine, together with their advice thereupon, without any further prosecution to be 
had before use for the same.”). In an effort to date the commencement of a court of chancery, it bears mention that 
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which were already ordained and established with judges and practitioners 
defensive of their jurisdiction,77 Chancery took as the basis of its 
jurisdiction the maxim, aequitas agit in personam. By acting in personam, 
Chancery could administer complete relief according to conscience and the 
principles of natural justice, without reference to the common law or its 
courts.78
The Chancellor unrolled a vast body of legal principle to which we now 
refer as Equity to offer relief in those cases where, because of the 
technicality of procedure, defective methods of proof, and other 
shortcomings in the Common Law, there was no “plain, adequate and 
complete remedy” otherwise available.79 In this context, plain is the 
opposite of “doubtful and obscure.” 80 A remedy is not adequate if it “falls 
short of what the party is entitled to.”81 And a remedy that does not “attain 
the full end and justice of the case” is not complete.82 The legal remedy
must reach the whole mischief, and secure the whole right of the party in a 
perfect manner, at the present time, and in [the] future; otherwise, equity will 
interfere and give such relief and aid as the exigency of the particular case 
may require.83
Intervention was premised on the notion that justice incorporated the moral 
sense of the community, existing as a function not only of a community’s 
technical rules, but also of “magisterial good sense, unhampered by rule.”84
It was not a usurpation on the part of Chancery for the purpose of acquiring 
and exercising power; rather it was an interposition to correct gross injustice 
and to address circumstances which the static and rigid common law could 
not.85 There was a strong tendency to sacrifice the particular to the general, 
the earliest writers of the common law, such as Bracton, Glanville, Britton and Fleta make no reference to an 
equitable jurisdiction of a court of chancery. See also 10 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY A.D. 
1364 TO 1471 (William Paley Baildon ed., London, Bernard Quaritch 1896); id. at xix (“It seems clear that the 
Chancellor had and exercised judicial functions of his own as early as the reign of Richard II if not Edward III.”). 
See generally JOSEPH PARKES, A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1828).
77
 Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 312 (1933).
78
 Helmut Coing, English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon Law, 71 LAW QTRLY. REV. 
223 (April 1955).
79 ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 24 
(1952); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA § 33 AT 22-26 (12th ed. 1877); GEORGE COOPER, A TREATISE OF PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF 
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 128-29 (1813); MITFORD, EQUITY PLEADING 112, 123 (Jeremy, ed. ___); 1 
WOODES., LECTURES vii, 214, 215; ELIAS MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 17 
(1895); Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 854 (1918); 
Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 84 (1934).
80
 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33 at 22-26 (12th ed. 1877) (citing 
Rathbone v. Warren, 10 Johns. 587; King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384; Southampton Dock Co. v. Southampton H. 
& P. Board, L. R. 11 Eq. 254).
81
 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33 at 22-26 (12th ed. 1877).
82
 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33 at 22-26 (12th ed. 1877) (“Where the 
remedy at law is adequate, but is involved in delay and is in several respects inconvenient and circuitous, the 
cause will entertain jurisdiction in equity.”)
83
 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33 at 22-26 (12th ed. 1877).
84
 Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 701-02 (1913).
85
 Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21, 
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justice to certainty.”86 The function of Equity was the correction of the law 
where it was deficient by reason of its universality.87 The regimes of Law 
and Equity thus approached a given set of facts from opposite angles—
invoking distinctive traditions, applying different reasoning, and pursuing 
separate aims.88
This exercise of defining Equity invites an immediate comparison to 
ADR. As with Equity,89 ADR is routinely noted as difficult to define.90
Both systems tend to be defined by the heterogeneous medley of subjects 
that they resolve rather than a priori reasoning:
ADR has never had a unified theory to explain what it accomplishes and how 
it works. … It is easier to point to discrete practices than to discern the entire 
direction of the new movement. ADR has no generally accepted abstract or 
theoretical definition.91
Yet with both, elaborate systems of illustrations and generalizations, even if 
“loose and liberal, large and vague,”92 suggests some discernible 
jurisprudence.93
22 (1919-1920).
86
 Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 310 (1933).
87 ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, V, xiv; CICERO, DE ORATORE, I, § 57; JUSTINIAN, PANDECT, 50.17.85; BRACTON, DE 
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, I, iv, § 5 (1569); GROTIUS, DE AEQUITATE, c. 1, § 2 (1689) (“Haec 
Aequitas suggerit, etsi jure deficiamur.”); 5 PUFFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, c. 12, § 21 (Oldfather’s transl. 1934); 
1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 3 (14th ed. 1918).
88 See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 444 
(2003).
89 See, e.g., William Q. deFuniak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54 (1948-1949) (“All 
writers on the subject of equity seem to start their discussions in agreement that the term is difficult to define.”); 
CHARLES E. HOGG, EQUITY PRINCIPLES 3 (1900) (“[T]o attempt to define the powers and jurisdiction of a court of 
equity would only result in embarrassment and confusion….”); Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity 
Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23 (1951) (“The legal term ‘equity’ is generally acknowledged to be 
impossible to define completely.”); Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 
31 VA. L. REV. 753, 756 (1945) (“There is no definition of equity that will satisfy.”).
90 See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-
Opted or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1. 1 n.2 (1991) (“Terminology and categorization are very 
problematic in this field.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument that the term 
“ADR” Has Begun to Outlive its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97, 102 (2000) (noting that the modes of ADR 
range from “pin stripes” to “Birkenstocks). See also n.__ supra and accompanying text. And, of course, problems 
with terminology can, in turn, create doctrinal and analytical challenges. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding 
Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument that the term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive its Usefulness, 2000 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 97, 110 (2000) (“We should be more self-conscious of grouping together techniques that may often 
merit separate analysis.”).
91
 Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 425-26 (1986). Compare FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF 
ACTION 19 (Chaytor ed. 1909) (“I do not think that any one has expounded or ever will expound equity as a 
single, consistent system, an articulate body of law. It is a collection of appendixes between which there is no very 
close connection.”); Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 315 (1938) (referring to Equity as a 
set of “empirical remedies”—disconnected appendices or glosses to the common law in particular areas);
Alexander Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New Federal Procedure, 31 CAL. L. 
REV. 127, 130 (1942-1943) (referring to the separate systems of law and equity as “accidents of history”).
92
 William Searle Holdsworth, The Early History of Equity, 13 MICH. L. REV. 293, 295 (1915) (discussing 
the jurisprudence of equity) (quotation omitted).
93
 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or 
“The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1. 2 (1991) (discussing the development of a “‘jurisprudence’ of 
ADR”); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 222 (1995) (discussing the evolution and history of a “law of ADR”).
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The systemic comparison runs still deeper. Both Equity and ADR pre-
existed their respective formal counterparts.94 And both matured 
incrementally and in reaction to those formal systems.95 Courts of Equity 
exercised jurisdiction if, but only if, the law courts failed to provide plain, 
adequate and complete relief.96 Every order or rule administered in Equity 
was born of some emergency, to meet some new condition that was not 
otherwise remediable in the Common Law courts.97 Catching the overflow 
of the litigation crisis in waves of procedural reforms,98 ADR may be no 
less an accident of history: ADR may not be “so much as a good, in and of 
itself, but rather as a good because the system is in ‘crisis’ and something is 
needed to fix it.” 99
In crude summary, then, both ADR and Equity are systems that channel 
a jurisprudence larger than themselves with a jurisdiction defined in large 
part by the inability of their respective formal counterparts to adjudicate a 
particular matter plainly, adequately, and completely.
B.  Identifying Motives
A fundamental difference between the jurisdiction of Equity and the 
jurisdiction of ADR is who makes the determination about whether the 
94 See nn. __ and accompanying text, infra and supra. See also Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 213 (1995) (discussing 
“What came first?”). ). The roots of equity run as deep as history can dig. See generally History of the 
Peloponnesian War, in 3 THUCYDIDES 37–40 (Richard Crawley trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952); The Laws, 
in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 757d–e, 736d–e, 875c (Benjamin Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952); The 
Statesman, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 294a (Benjamin Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952); GEORGE 
SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 326 (1846) (associating the royal 
prerogative with sovereignty itself).
95 See nn. __ and accompanying text, infra and supra.
96 EDMUND H. T. SNELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 2 (18th ed. 1920). See also Sherman Steele, The Origin 
and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 10, 13 (1926) (“The process of delimiting the 
jurisdiction of chancery was largely one of self-determination.”); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW 453 (5th ed. 1931) (“To write fully of the equitable jurisdiction of the Chancellor would be to 
write the history of equity itself”).
97 See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 48 at 49 (2d ed. 1892) 
(“[E]very equitable rule which it announced, was of necessity an innovation to a greater or less extent upon the 
then existing common law”); Alexander Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New 
Federal Procedure, 31 CAL. L. REV. 127, 130 (1943) (history of equity).
98
 For a discussion of ADR in the context of other procedural reforms, see Judith Resnik, Many Doors? 
Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 222-241 
(1995); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait 
Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 309-23 (1996).
99
 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 244-45 (1995). See also Judith Resnik, Civil Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: 
A Panel Discussion, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1199, 1207 (1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an 
Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991); 
Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to 
the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 450-51 (1989); Harry Edwards, 
Commentary: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 672-74 (1986).
Compare FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 3 (__) (suggesting that by 
the end of the thirteenth century the number of petitions had become very large and the work of reading them was 
onerous).
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remedy provided by the formal system is plain, adequate and complete to 
the satisfaction of the litigant. In Equity, the Chancellor made that 
decision.100 Participation in ADR, however, if often at the discretion of the 
parties.101 To compare the systems of ADR and Equity, then, one must 
explore the motives that generate interest in ADR.
In the sections that follow, I examine the keystones of the system of 
ADR, and explore their medieval equitable analogues. A quote from the 
ADR casebook authored by Professors Riskin and Westbrook provides the 
organizational structure for this discussion. Those thoughtful commentators
write:
Five motives, often intermingled, fire most of the current interest in 
alternatives to traditional litigation: 1. Saving time and money, and possibly 
rescuing the judicial system from an overload; 2. Having “better” processes—
more open, flexible and responsive to the unique needs of the participants. … 
3. Achieving “better” results—outcomes that serve the real needs of the 
participants or society; 4. Enhancing community involvement in the dispute 
resolution process; and 5. Broadening access to “justice”.102
As explored in the sections that follow, each of these motives echoes a 
theme that is characteristic of Equity.
1. Saving Time and Money
Rhetoric about the rampant costs and inefficiencies of formal 
adjudication occupies a central role in the ADR canon.103
The common perception is that judges and lawyers, the procedural rigor of 
justice and substantive incantations of legality, lay juries and technical experts 
hurt more than they help. The recourse to legal actors and proceedings is 
100 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
101
 Of course not all ADR is voluntary. See ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, 
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 545-596 (3rd ed. 2002); Edward F. Sherman, 
Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU L. 
REV. 2079 (1993).
102 LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 2 (2d ed. 1997). 
Another leading ADR casebook offers the following list of “justifications” for ADR: (i) “To lower court 
caseloads and expenses”; (ii) “To reduce the parties’ expenses and time”; (iii) “To provide speedy settlement of
those disputes that were disruptive of the community or the lives of the parties’ families”; (iv) “To improve public 
satisfaction with the justice system”; (v) “To encourage resolutions that were suited to the parties’ needs”; (vi) 
“To increase voluntary compliance with resolutions”; (vii) “To restore the influence of neighborhood and 
community values and the cohesiveness of communities”; (viii) “To provide accessible forums to people with 
disputes”; and (ix) “To teach the public to try more effective processes than violence or litigation for settling 
disputes.” STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS, SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003). Although I opted for the 
Riskin & Westbrook framework for organizational purposes (finding less overlap in the enumerated factors), I 
also refer occasionally to the Goldberg et al. factors.
103 LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED 
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998) (a principal motive fueling ADR is “saving time and money, and possibly rescuing the 
judicial system from an overload”). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS 
& SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 
2003) (“To lower court caseloads and expenses; To reduce the parties’ expenses and time, To provide speedy 
settlement of those disputes that were disruptive of the community or the lives of the parties’ families”).
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costly, emotionally debilitating, and potentially counterproductive.104
[T]he adversary system … can be a hugely inefficient means of uncovering 
facts; its relentless formalities and ceaseless opportunities for splitting hairs 
are time consuming and expensive.105
Naturally, these criticisms are often infused with crisis rhetoric about the 
litigation explosion and overburdened courts.106 By providing “a less 
legalistic process than litigation”107 the effective use of ADR is thought to 
compare favorably with the acrimony, costs, and time of ordinary 
litigation.108
Equity, too, was “simple, inexpensive and speedy in its origins.”109
Litigants came to Equity to avoid the gratuitous rigor, relentless formalities, 
and tedious hair-splitting that epitomized formal adjudication in the 
common law courts.110 In Equity there were no technical rules of pleading 
or procedure.111 Indeed, animated by the juristic principles of discretion, 
natural justice, fairness and good conscience, the essence of a jurisprudence 
of equity is somewhat inconsistent with the establishment of formal rules.112
104 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND 
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1 (1989).
105 JETHRO LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 171 (1983).
106 See nn. __ and accompanying text, supra.
Alvin B. Rubin et al., Colloquy on Complex Litigation, 1981 BYU L. REV. 741, 747 (“[I]f more is not done 
to reduce the expense of litigation, the legal profession will be destroyed.”); Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury 
Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United 
States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465 (1984) (growing workload demands 
on courts “best relieved by diverting cases” to ADR techniques); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the 
Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 
RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 253 (1985); Chief Justice Urges Greater Use of Arbitration to Relieve Courts of Litigation 
Burdens, 17 THE THIRD BRANCH 1, 1 (Oct. 1985); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 
69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (discussing “litigation explosion”).
107
 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 703, 721(1999). See also Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorney’s Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 
SMU L. REV. 2005, 2028 (1993) (there is “much less ‘lawyering’ in arbitration than in litigation”).
108
 Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving Perspective to Informed 
Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 909, 909 n.2 (2002). See also Maureen A. Weston, Checks on 
Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, 
Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 592 (2001) (calling the ADR movement an “effort to avoid the 
delay, expense, technicality, and acrimony of traditional judicial litigation”). For a discussion of contemporary 
empirical data about time and cost savings, see nn. __ infra and accompanying text. In this Part II.B., however, 
ADR is contemplated in its pure, original form.
109
 Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L. REV. 109, 112 (1934). A 
discussion of the ossification of equity procedure is reserved for Part III, infra.
110 See nn. __ infra and accompanying text.
111
. See Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 88 
(1934) (“No form was necessary and no strict procedure had to be followed.”); William F. Walsh, Equity Prior to 
the Chancellor’s Court, 17 GEO. L.J. 97, 106 (1928-1929) (“Relief was given without a writ. The bill [in equity] 
was generally in simply form, without formality, and free from the technical rules which applied to writs.”); 
Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 854 (1918) (“Less 
exactness of pleading was required than by the law, and even if a bill were ‘misconceived’ the complaint was not 
out of court.”).
112 See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 20 (1905). See generally Colin P. 
Campbell, The Court of Equity—A Theory of its Jurisdiction, 15 GREEN BAG 108, 110 (1903) (noting the intimacy 
of the relations among the basic principles of “natural justice, equity, honest, generosity and good conscience”).
See generally FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 12-22 (Chaytor ed. 1909); 
JOHN SALMOND, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1893) (suggesting there is no body of rules for 
equity)_; JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 64 (1913) 
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Equity’s mandate to do justice demanded that it be administered swiftly and 
inexpensively.113 Litigants did not need the representation of a pleader.114
Nor were litigants required to pay a filing fee.115
The comparative advantage in “time and money” that both ADR and 
Equity purported to offer as alternative systems was largely a function of 
their “better processes” and “better results.” That discussion follows 
immediately in subparts 2 and 3, infra.
2. Procedural Flexibility
Interest in ADR is also generated by the desire for processes that can be 
tailored to the unique needs of a particular case.116 Proponents of ADR 
argue that control or autonomy over issues of process may lead to a more 
effective and satisfying resolution of the dispute.117 The ADR narrative 
emphasizes that rigid procedural rules can be manipulated, misused, and 
abused by “‘gladiators’ fixated on purely adversarial solutions.”118 The 
relative informality of ADR means that pre-trial procedures, elaborate 
pleading, motion practice, and discovery can be modified, streamlined, or in 
many cases completely eliminated to reach the merits of the dispute.119 Of 
course formal adjudication is thought to have experienced a similar 
conversion in favor of a flexible and subservient procedural schemata.120
Yet ADR remains a popular alternative to many because of its “‘better’ 
processes—more open, flexible and responsive to the unique needs of the 
(describing equity as a court “of indefinite powers and unrestricted procedure”).
113 JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 103-04 (4th ed. 2002)
114
 Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760 
n.17 (1945).
115
 Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760 
n.17 (1945).
116 LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED 
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH 
RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003) (“To 
improve public satisfaction with the justice system; … to increase voluntary compliance with resolutions”)
117
 Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving Perspective to Informed 
Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 909, ___ (2002) (commenting that autonomy is a key value in 
ADR).
118
 Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Legal Problem Solving, 11 
CLINICAL L: REV. 149, 159 (2004) (citations omitted).
Of course whether disputants favor adversarialism is highly disputed. See, e.g., Laurens Walker, E. Allan 
Lind & John Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1420 
(1979).
119
 Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorney’s Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 SMU L. REV. 2005, 2027-
28 (1993). See also Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 
31 (1987) (viewing ADR as procedural reform). See also Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 31, 33 (1987) (“While various ADR procedures permit some exchange of 
information between disputants, the process is informal, ambiguous, and not administered in a managerial 
fashion…. The spirit of ADR is antidiscovery.”).
120 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
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participants.”121 ADR offers relief from the “formal, tricky, divisive, time-
consuming, and distorting” subterfuge that plagues formal adjudication.122
The Law courts were notorious for their idolatry of form and forms.123
Complex, unforgiving and formulaic rules of pleading, procedure, and proof 
could be navigated successfully only by the “form-mad common 
lawyers.”124 Failure to purchase the correct writ or to comply with minor 
technical requirements were incurable mistakes.125 The rigors of single 
issue pleading, too, tolerated not even the slightest misjudgment.126 The 
entire fate of a lawsuit could turn upon the exact words that the parties 
uttered when they appeared before the tribunal: “The client was unthought 
of…. The right was nothing, the mode of stating, everything.”127
If a wrong action was adopted, the error was fatal to the whole proceeding, 
however clearly the facts of the controversy might have been brought before 
the proper court…. It was not enough that he stood within the temple of 
justice, he must have entered through a particular door.128
This pathways-to-justice metaphor (although evocative of Sander’s “multi-
door courthouse”129) may be deceptively pacific. Other commentators used 
121 LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED 
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998).
122
 Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 (1986). See also nn. __ and accompanying text, supra.
123
 William Q. de Funiak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54, 57 (1948-1949) (“A growing 
worship of formalism and technicality also began to obsess the courts of law.”); George Palmer Garrett, The Heel 
of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 32, 35 (1924-25) (“[T]he Common Law has brought about its own downfall by its 
idolatry of the forms it created.”).
124
 George Palmer Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 30, 31 (discussing “form-mad common 
lawyers”). See also George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM L. REV. 87, 96 (1916) 
(explaining the law court’s “hard and fast system”); JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN 
ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 61-62 (1913) (referring to the common law’s “formulaic procedure”); 1 
WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW ___ (__ ed. ___) (discussing the “complicated 
machinery” of the law courts).
125 JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING 39 (1969) (“When the plaintiff 
petitioned the Chancellor for an Original Writ, he was under great pressure to select the right Writ for the facts of 
his case…. If he selected a Form of Writ which did not fit his case … he could not succeed.”).
126
 The common law pleadings rules earned the dubious distinction as “the most exact, if not the most occult, 
of the sciences.” 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WM. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 612. There are 
three fundamental rules to single-issue pleading. First, after a declaration, the parties must at each stage (i) demur; 
(ii) plead by way of traverse; or (iii) plead by way of confession and avoidance. Second, upon a traverse, issue 
must be tendered. And third, the issue, when well tendered, must be accepted. Either by virtue of the first rule, a 
demurrer takes place which is a tneder of an issue in law, or, by the joint operation of the first two rules, the tender 
of an issue in fact. And then, by virtue of the second and third rules, the issue so tendered, whether in fact or in 
law, is accepted and becomes finally complete. It is by these rules that th eproduction of an issue is effected. See 
generally HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 136 (2d ed. 1901). Encyclopedic 
volumes of supplemental rules and principles ensure the production of an issue that is truly but one issue, see, e.g., 
id. §§ 137-69, 164-339, that is material, see, e.g., id. §§ 170-74, 340-45, and is unified, see, e.g., §§ 175-90, 346-
71, and is certain, see, e.g, id. §§ 191-228, 372-430, and is neither obscure nor confusing, see, e.g., §§ 229-243, 
431-52, and will lead to neither prolixity nor delay in pleading, see, e.g., §§ 244-49, 453-65. See also id. §§ 250-
59, 466-81 (“Certain Miscellaneous Rules”); R. ROSS PERRY, COMMON-LAW PLEADING 231-81 (1897) 
(discussing the rules and mechanics of issue pleading).
127
 Coleridge, The Law in 1847 and the Law in 1889, THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW 797, 800 (1890). See 
also FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WM. MAITLAND, 1 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 559 (__ ed. 19__).
128 CHARLES HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 46 
(1987).
129
 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON 
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war metaphors to express the stakes and the intricate terms of 
engagement.130 By all accounts, the process was a contest of skill; and 
success depended upon observing the formal rules of the combat.131
The contemporary discourse of ADR uses the same rhetoric and 
metaphors in its derisive characterizations of formal adjudication.132 In fact, 
the Roscoe Pound speech that served as the rallying cry for Chief Justice 
Burger’s Pound Conference in 1976 (the birth of the modern ADR 
movement133) was itself a plea for equity. Roscoe Pound referred to the 
“sporting theory of justice” when criticizing the rigidity of common law 
pleading.134 Arguing in 1906 for a more equity-based procedure, Pound 
criticized the sporting theory on the ground that it led to deciding cases 
“according to the rules of the game” rather than in accordance with a 
“search independently for truth and justice.”135
Although the manner by which procedure was exploited in the Law 
courts and in contemporary formal adjudication differed,136 the result of the 
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (“The room directory in the lobby 
of such a [Dispute Resolution] Center might looks as follows: Screening Clerk—Room 1; Mediation—Room 2; 
Arbitration—Room 3 …”). See generally Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 217 (1995) (discussing Sander’s metaphor). 
See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait 
Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 348 (1996) 
(discussing the importance of the procedural justice metaphors).
130
[The system of common law forms of action] contains every species of medieval weapon from a two handed 
sword to the poniard. The man who has a quarrel with his neighbor comes hither to choose his weapon. The 
choice is large; but he must remember that he will not be able to change weapons in the middle of the ocmbat 
and also that every weapon has its proper use and may put to none other. If he selects a sword, he must 
observe the rules of swod-play; he must not to try to use his cross-bow as a mace.
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WM. MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 559.
For a discussion of the importance of metaphors generally, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How 
Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225 (1995).
131 CHARLES HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND
47-48 (1897) (The issue of the combat must not be determined by mere brute force—not even by the brute force 
of indisputable facts arrayed before the Court.”)
132 See, e.g., Douglas Yarn, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through 
Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 957 (2004) (referring to adjudication and ADR as “war and 
diplomacy,” respectively) (citation omitted); Robert F. Blomquist, Some (Mostly) Theoretical and (Very Brief) 
Pragmatic Observations on Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution in America, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 343, 
__ (2000) (discussing the relative efficiency and efficacy of ADR in contrast to “courtroom battles”); Kenneth R. 
Feinberg, Resolving Mass Tort Claims: The Perspective of a Special Master, 53- WTR DISP. RESOL. J. 10, __ 
(1998) (contrasting ADR with the typical “protracted litigation war of attrition”); Thomas R. McCoy, The 
Sophisticated Consumer’s Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques: What You Should Expect (or 
Demand) From ADR Services, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 975, __ (1996) (“Mediation is not a spectator sport for the 
parties like litigation where lawyer-champions do battle on behalf of their parties…”); Richard A. Williamson, 
The Use of Experts Under the Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Forums, PLI Order No. H4-5185 Mar.-Apr. 1994 at 414 (“Whereas litigation is war, Arbitration is a Skirmish, 
and Mediation, Early Neutral Evaluation and similar informal non-binding ADR process can be likened to 
Powwows that may lead to a lasting and satisfactory peace.”).
133 See nn. __ supra.
134
 Roscoe Pound, The Canons of Procedural Reform, 12 A.B.A. J. 541, 543 (1926).
135
 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 
729, 738 (1906).
See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
136
 In the Law courts it was the technicality of the rules that created the problem. In contemporary 
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exploitation was the same (and with lawyers to blame).137 Like ADR 
centuries later, Equity sought to relocate dispute resolution away from an 
emphasis on procedure, and toward a consideration of the underlying 
merits.
The Common Law made a fetich of procedure. Obviously, this was to put the 
cart before the horse. In any satisfactory system of law, procedure must 
always remain a means, not an end. It must always be subordinate to the 
purpose of the process, which is to right wrong. Glanville, and Bracton, and 
Littleton, and Coke forgot this. They became so interested in forms that they 
allowed the substance to escape.138
With neither forms of action nor technical pleading rules Equity focused 
instead on the merits of the dispute.139 Although “form” is not itself a 
pejorative,140 one could fairly conclude that “law deal[t] with form, equity 
adjudication, it is (allegedly) their generality that is exploited. Add cites discussing the writs and forms of action. 
Add cites discussing the dimensions of transsubstantive and non-transsubstantive procedure.
137 Compare Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the 
Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 938-945 (discussing “scorched earth litigation” and “Rambo 
tactics” by litigators in a search of a competitive advantage in high stakes litigation); William M. Howard, 
Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. 
REV. 255, 289 (1994) (suggesting that many formal court actions are extended unnecessarily by lawyers who 
exploit or abuse judicial procedures, especially liberal rules for pretrial discovery); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 
2240 (1989) (“Discovery of documents in cases involving the conduct of business or government often proceeds 
by a vicious game in which the respondent has every incentive to trim and cheat. Highly developed dialectical 
skills have evolved.”) with nn. ___, supra.
138 George Palmer Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 30, 31 (1924-1925). Compare Robert W. 
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1988) (Lawyers “are expected and even 
encouraged to exploit every loophole in the rules, take advantage of every one of their opponents’ tactical 
mistakes or oversights, and stretch every legal or factual interpretation to favor their clients. The guiding premise 
of the entire system is that maintaining the integrity of rights-guarding procedures is more important than … 
enforcing the substantive law against its violators.”).
139
 Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 40 (1951) 
(“[T]he plaintiff set forth his cause in a ‘bill.’ Then the chancellor would issue a ‘subpoena,’ in the king’s name, 
to summon the opposing party, who could demur, enter a plea, or file an ‘answer.”).
No form was necessary and no strict procedure had to be followed. The difference from proceedings on writs 
is significant. It may be said that all that was necessary was to state sufficient facts to show a reason for 
granting relief. Indeed it appears that if a bill did not state sufficient facts, permission was granted by the 
Justice to amend viva voce, a procedure which would not have been tolerated at Westminster.
Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 89 (1934).
In the equity procedure one encounters no bewildering rules as to the name or classification of the particular 
suit, or according to the nomenclature at law, “forms of action.” When from an investigation of the law and 
facts, counsel has determined that the client has a good cause for equitable relief, he is saved the problem of 
wasting brain-sweat in deciding whether he shall sue in debt, assumpsit, or covenant, in trover or replevin, in 
trespass vi et armis or trespass on the case He simply decides to file a “bill in equity.”
EDWIN B. MEADE, LILE’S EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 95 at 59 (3rd ed. 1952). See generally Thomas O. 
Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 457-58 (2003).
140
The science of special pleading is an excellent logic; it is admirably calculated for the purposes of analyzing a 
cause, of extracting, like the roots of an equation, the true points in dispute, and referring them with all 
imaginable distinctness to the court or jury. It is reducible to the strictest rules of pure dialectics, and tends to 
fix the attention, give a habit of reasoning clearly, quicken the apprehension and invigorate the understanding.
Sir William Jones’ Works. Prefatory Discourse to the Speeches of Isæus, IV. 34. (f.) IX. 50, 51 (8 vo.). See also 
Robinson v. Rayley, 1 Burr., at p. 319 (Mansfield, J.) (“the substantial rules of pleading are founded in strong 
sense and the soundest and closest logic.”); HALE, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW 212 (comparing 
pleading rules to the roots of an equation).
One of the best qualities of our medieval law was that in theory it left little or nothing at all events within the 
sphere of procedure, to the discretion of the justices. They themselves desired that this should be so and took 
care that it was or seemed to be so. They would be responsible for nothing beyond an application of iron 
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with substance.”141 Chancery “had the power to look beyond the form to the 
substance and may lend his power in aid of a person wronged to see that the 
wrong does not go without a remedy.”142
Blaming the legal education and training for much of the distortion, 
both Equity and ADR promise an alternative that elevates the merits of the 
disputes over the forms and modes of its adjudication.143 ADR and Equity 
thus can both be cast as an escape from systems where the formalized 
means for protecting rights themselves become the barriers to the effective 
redress of grievances.144
Lawyers may be drawn to ADR for reasons other than savings of cost or 
time.145 Privacy is one component of the procedural flexibility that makes 
ADR attractive to some.146 Unlike formal adjudication, pleadings (if any) 
need not publicly filed; hearings are neither known nor available to the 
public; there may exist no transcript; and even the decision need not be 
rules.
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WM. MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 561 (___). See also id.
(“Had they aimed at a different end, they would have “received” the plausibly reasonable system of procedure 
which the civilians and canonists were constructing, and then the whole stream of our legal history would have 
been turned into a new channel. For good and ill they made their choice.”)
141
 Edward Robeson Taylor, The Fusion of Law and Equity, __ U. PA. L. REV. 17 (___).
142
 Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 90 
(1934).
143
 For a discussion of how form was the focus of both the practice and the study of the Law, see THEODORE 
F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 380-81 (5th ed. 1956) (discussing efforts of 
Glanville, Bracton and Littleton.); JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY ___ [49-
52??](4th ed. 2002); S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 59 (2d ed. 1981) 
(explaining that procedure dicatated how the law existed and how lawyers thought); JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & 
ALISON REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING (1969) (“the Law was required to express itself through the Limited 
System of Writs and Forms of Action sanctioned by precedent”). HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON 
EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883) (noting that common lawyers could see the law “only through the envelope 
of its technical forms.”).
Compare Laura Nader & Linda R. Singer, Dispute Resolution: What are the Choices?, CALIF. ST. BAR J. 
281, 314-15 (July 1976):
Law schools rarely teach the essential skills of negotiation and mediation; rather their concentration on the 
dissection of appellate court cases emphasizes the escalation of disputes rather than their prevention or early 
settlement. Heavy dependence on the case method, with its focus on individual problems, makes unlikely any 
systematic approach to resolving mass problems. The dearth of interdisciplinary study makes it difficult for 
lawyers to perceive alternative ways of dealing with different types of existing disputes and those likely to 
arise from emerging technologies.
144 Compare THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND 
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1 (1989) (__) with Coleridge, The Law in 1847 and the Law in 1889, __ THE 
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW 797, 798 (June 1890) (“[T]ruth was quite unable to force its way through the barriers 
erected against its opposite.”). See also FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 12-
22 (Chaytor ed. 1909); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 1-5 (13th ed. 1906) (suggesting that the true and original 
distinction between law and equity is one, not between two conflicting bodies of rules, but between a system of 
judicial administration based on fixed rules and a competing system governed solely by judicial discretion); 
JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 64 (1913) (referring to 
equity as a court “of indefinite powers and unrestricted procedure”).
145
 Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58- APR DISP. RESOL. J. 37, 39 (Feb.-
Apr. 2003) (highlighting the values of selecting a decision maker, secrecy and flexibility in scheduling).
146 See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 47, 54 (1996); Edward J. Costello, Jr., ADR: Virtue or Vice?, 54- May DISP. RESOL. J. 62 (1999); Robert F. 
Blomquist, Is Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution Working in America?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10661, 
10666 (2000).
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released to anyone other than the interested parties.147 The informality and 
flexibility of Equity made those proceedings similarly “private,” at least in 
certain respects. For example, in early Equity many proceedings were 
initiated not by a recorded bill, but by word of mouth.148 And because there 
was no notion of precedent in early Equity, the reporting of Chancery 
proceeding was sporadic and largely unnecessary.149 Moreover, similar to 
the ADR forum-of-choice, a private conference room or hotel suite,150
Chancery “could sit anywhere, even in the chancellor’s private house.”151
Of course ADR and Equity suffered criticism for this informality and 
secrecy.152
Part of the allure of ADR may be that system’s ability to alter the 
procedure to identify a procedurally neutral site. Formal adjudication tends 
to locate the suit in the “home” court of one party or the other. Because both 
sides have the same home court instinct, the only neutral forum on which 
they can agree is ADR.153 This is especially an issue in international 
147
 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 703, 721-23(1999).
148 See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 103 (4th ed. 2002).
149 See Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 763 
(1945) (“there were no regular reports of the cases that were decided”); 73 SELDEN SOCIETY, NOTTINGHAM’S 
CHANCERY CASES VOL. 1, Introduction, xlii & n.3 (D.E.C. Yale, ed.1957); Vidal v. Girard’s Exrs., 2 How. 127, 
193 (1844) (Story, J.) (equity decisions had no precedential effect because the rulings were contained in reports 
that were “shadowy, obscure and flickering”).
Bacon’s desire to systematize the practice of the Court of Chancery is also illustrated by his plea for equity 
law reports, contained in his “Proposition touching the Compiling and Amendment of the Laws of England’ 
addressed to james I during his attorney-generalship. In it he pays a rare tribute to Coke, when he observes 
that but for the reports of the great chief justice ‘the law by this time had been almost like a ship without 
ballast,’ and he urges the sovereign to appoint ‘grave and sound lawyers’ to be paid reporters in the courts. 
This suggestion bore fruit in 1617, for on October 20th (only a few months after Bacon had assumed office), 
the “Ordinance for the Constitution of the Reporters of the Law’ was issued, two reporters, with a salary of 
£100 a year each being appointed. The size of the salary, unusual in those days, may be taken as an indication 
of the importance that Bacon attached to law reporting.
George W. Keeton, Bacon as a Chancery Judge, 17 IOWA L. REV. 476, 477-78 (1932-1933).
150 STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 7 (2002). Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S. 
Abrahams, The Trouble with Arbitration, LITIG. Winter 1985, 30, 31 (“Often the room is a hotel suite sporting 
masonite folding tables positioned in an inverted “U.” There is no gavel or bailiff, no robed figure sitting above 
the proceeding. Rather, there are one to three businessmen, seated comfortably at the top of the “U,” chatting 
informally with the parties.”). See also Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 248-49 (1995) (discussing the ADR 
empowerment thesis in the context of the informality of those proceedings).
151 See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 103 (4th ed. 2002).
152 See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 28 
(1987) (“the absence of records and of written opinions make the pathology of ADR difficult.”). In Equity the 
criticism was part of an attack on the overall arbitrariness of the system. See, e.g., JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE 
TALK 64 (The Legal Classics Library 1989) (“Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure … equity is 
according to the conscience of himthat is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. Tis all one as 
if they should make the standard for the measure a Chancellor’s foot.”); 6 BULSTRODE WHITELOCK, COMMONS 
JOURNALS 373 (1650) (“The proceedings in Chancery are secundum arbitrium boni viri, and this arbitrium 
differeth as much in several men as their countenances differ. That which is right in one man’s eyes is wrong in 
another’s.”); Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 82 
(1934) (Mocking the jurisprudence of equity as “some sort of Philosopher’s Stone by which injustice is whisked 
into justice by the simple method of preparing a form of petition lately called a ‘bill’.”).
153 See Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause—Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 
575, 581 (1988).
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disputes.154 Here the analogy from Equity is rather loose. Although we 
know that Equity courts “could sit anywhere”155 we have no reason to 
believe that the Chancellor opted for a neutral site.
An expert decision-maker is another component of the procedural 
flexibility that makes ADR attractive. In certain complex cases, litigants 
may wish to avoid a jury or judge in favor of a neutral with technical 
expertise.156 Equity procedure may be considered analogous here only in 
that there were no juries.157 Of course to the extent that the jurisprudence of 
Equity was but the jurisprudence of conscience,158 the chancellor, often a 
trained ecclesiastic, was undoubtedly an “expert.”159
And lastly, finality and the avoidance of an expensive and time-
consuming appellate process is another claimed advantage of the flexibility 
of ADR.160 As a result of the Federal Arbitration Act, and equivalent state 
statutes and international treaties, arbitration awards are final and can be as 
easy (or even easier) to enforce as decisions from judges and juries.161
Again there is an equitable analogue: relief was enforced at once, and we 
understand that there were no appeals from Chancery until the seventeenth 
century.162
154 See nn. __, supra. See also Andrew Sagartz, Note, Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: 
Surmounting Barriers of Culture Without Going to Court, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675 (1998).
155 See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 103 (4th ed. 2002).
156
 Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is there a Role for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 SUM 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 189 (1991) (suggesting that the use expert adjudication may be the “main appeal 
of private arbitration”).
157
[Common law courts] proceed to the trial of contested facts by means of a jury; and the evidence is generally 
to be drawn, not from the parties, but from third persons, who are disinterested witnesses. But courts of equity 
try causes without a jury; and they address themselves to the conscience of the defendant, and require him to 
answer upon his oath the matters of fact stated in the bill, if they are within his knowledge; and he is 
compellable to give a full account of all such facts, with all their circumstances, without evasion, or 
equivocation; and the testimony of other witnesses also may be taken to confirm, or to refute, the facts so 
alleged. Indeed, every bill in equity may be said to be, in some sense, a bill of discovery, since it asks for the 
personal oath of the defendant, to purge himself in regard to the transactions stated in the bill. It may readily 
be perceived, how very important this process of discovery may be, when we consider how great the mass of 
human transactions is, in which there are no other witnesses, or persons, having knowledge thereof, except the 
parties themselves.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 31 at 21 (12th ed. 1877).
158 See nn. __, supra  and accompanying text.
159 See nn. __, supra and accompanying text.
160
 Kevin R. Case, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 5 (1993); Stephen J. 
Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 722-
23 (1999).
161
 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 703, 722-23 (1999).
162
 Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 935-36 (1997) (“in 
1675, the House of Lords accepted jurisdiction over ‘appeals in equity’ from Chancery.”). See also JULIUS 
GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 26 
(The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1971) (suggesting that 
the colonial appeal could not “have been in imitation of the English Chancery appeal, for this was still, so to 
speak, in vetre sa mere when the the first American enactments were put on the books.”). See generally Benjamin 
Goldman, The Scope of Review and Requests for Rulings in Equity Suits, 23 B.U. L. REV. 66 (1943). Cf. Mary 
Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 927 (1997) (explaining a horizontal 
system of mutual review by peer courts).
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3. Substantive Flexibility
Although the substantive law undoubtedly casts its “shadow” on ADR 
processes,163 we may be skeptical of the significance of shadows.164 In the 
more voluntary and less structured forms of ADR, such as mediation, where 
the ultimate authority belongs to the participants themselves, the parties 
(perhaps with the benefit of a third party facilitator) can fashion a unique 
solution that will work for them without being strictly governed by 
precedent.165 Rigid adherence to legal formulae can frame debates in a zero-
sum model that obscures parties’ goals and overlooks a richer set of 
possible resolutions.166
A formalist, rule-bound institution is ill equipped to recognize what is really at 
stake in its conflicts with the environment. It is likely to adopt 
opportunistically because it lacks criteria for rational reconstruction of 
outmoded or inappropriate policies…. The idea of legality needs to be 
conceived more generally and to be cured of formalism.167
ADR is attractive to some, then, because of the system’s promise of “better” 
results that serve “the real needs of the participants or society.”168 These 
163 See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
164
 This is a reference to Plato’s famous allegory about the prisoners in the cave. PLATO, REPUBLIC, 514A-
521C.
165 J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT 
LITIGATION 10 (1984) 
166
 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 252 (internal footnotes omitted). HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF 
NEGOTIATION 33-35 91982); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. 
L. REV. 1, 15 (1987) (citing MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 25:01 (1984); JAY 
FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT 
LITIGATION 10 (1984); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 425, 529 (1986); Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 552). Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 182 
(2003). Of course suggesting that there is, in fact, a “right” answer presumes the superiority of the adversary ideal.
See, e.g., FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note __, at 56-80 (encouraging exploitation of differences in time 
horizons or risk preferences).
The dynamic of arbitrator self-interest has long been familiar in collective bargaining cases and is thought, for 
example, to provide one explanation for the apparently common practice of compromise awards. Repeat 
business for the arbitrator is likely only if he is able to retain the future goodwill of both union and 
management; the desire to do so may give him an incentive (in the hallowed phrase) to ‘split the baby’ in a 
single arbitration, or it may be ‘reflected in a course of decisions by the same arbitrator which over time, 
taken together, appears to show a rough balance between awards favorable to labor and those favorable to 
management.
Alan Scott Rau, Integrity to Private Judging, 38 SO. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523 (1997) (critiquing arbitration by 
analyzing the self interest of arbitrators).
167 PHILIPPE NONET AND PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE 77, 
108 (1978).
168 LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED 
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH 
RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003) (“To 
encourage resolutions that were suited to the parties’ needs; … To restore the influence of neighborhood and 
community values and the cohesiveness of communities”).
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results may or may not “follow the law,” and it arguably does not matter 
because of the parties’ voluntary acquiescence. 
In those forms of ADR that more closely resemble formal adjudication, 
such as binding arbitration, ADR’s relationship with the substantive law 
becomes much more nuanced. On the one hand, we view arbitration clauses 
as “forum selection clauses.”169 And in this regard we pronounce that “[b]y 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute,” and also remind lawyers that arbitrators are 
obliged to “follow the law.”170 Yet on the other hand, we also anticipate, if 
not desire a certain amount of deviation.
Soia Mentschikoff’s seminal survey of arbitrators found that eighty percent of 
the studied commercial arbitrators “thought that they ought to reach their 
decisions within the context of the principles of substantive rules of law, but 
almost ninety percent believed that they were free to ignore these rules 
whenever they thought that more just decisions would be reached by so 
doing.” A more recent survey of construction arbitrators found that twenty-
eight percent of surveyed arbitrators reported that they do not always follow 
the law in formulating their awards. And among labor arbitrators, the 
“orthodox” position is that arbitrators should adhere to the collective 
bargaining agreement and “ignore the law.” The widespread belief among 
arbitrators that they are under no duty to apply the law is consistent with 
standard expectations about arbitration because “we do not … expect that an 
arbitrator will decide a case the way a judge does. We do not expect that he 
will necessarily “follow the law”—or indeed apply or develop any body of 
general rules as a guide to his decision.” Even courts have explicitly 
acknowledged that arbitrators often do not apply the law.171
169 See Lee H. Rosenthal, ADR: One Judge’s Perspective on Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 669 (2005).
170
 “The Court conceives of arbitration clauses as forum-selection clauses, but not as choice-of-law clauses. 
In the Court’s view, then, an arbitration clause specifies the procedural law to be used in resolving a dispute, but 
not the substantive law to be used. With respect to substantive law, Mitsubishi indicates that arbitrators must 
apply the same substantive law a court would apply. Similarly, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220 (1987), the Court held that claims under the Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable because 
“although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that 
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute. 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987). The Court often says that “[b]y 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.” Id. at 
229.” Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 703, 717-18 (1999). See also Michael A. Scodro, Note, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A 
Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1946 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court’s view that 
arbitration does not alter substantive rights “is in keeping with the courts’ expectation that arbitrators will follow 
applicable legal rulings.”).
171
 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 703, 719-20 (1999) (citing Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 851, 
867 (1961); Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction Arbitrators, 23 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 154-55 (1994); JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, 
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 514, 636 (2nd ed. 1996); IV IAN MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS 
J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.5.2.4 at 40:47; Harry T. Edwards, “Arbitration of 
Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study,” in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT ANNUAL 
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59 (1975); Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators 
Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 683, 688 (1992); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and 
Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 85 (1992) (“The weight of authority permits an arbitrator to ‘do justice 
as he sees it’ and fashion an award that embodies the individual justice required by a given set of facts.”))..
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Inherent in the system of ADR is the notion that the arbiter or neutral is free 
to depart from the principles of substantive law whenever they think that 
more just decisions would be reached by doing so.172 Judges in the formal 
courts, of course, enjoy no such leeway.173
The occasional need to depart from the strict law likewise animated the 
development of the system of Equity. And a similar noble lie is repeated. 
On one hand, one of the most famous maxims of Equity was Æquitas 
sequitur legem, or Equity follows the Law.174 Yet on the other hand, the 
172
 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 703, 721 n.83(1999) (emphasis added) (citing I GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION § 25.01 at 391 (rev. ed. 1995)). For a more negative characterization of arbitrators’ failure to apply 
the law, see generally Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitration is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661 (1963) as cited in 
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV.
703, 721-23(1999); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 252 (commenting that ADR is typically “seen as focusing on 
issues, relaxing the law, and thus providing more ‘just’ results.”).
Of course even those arbitrators who try to apply the law will sometimes fail, as they may make honest 
mistakes of law. In most cases in which an arbitrator does not apply the law, it will be virtually impossible for a 
court to discover that the arbitrator did not apply the law. Arbitrators generally do not write reasoned opinions 
explaining their decisions.” Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through 
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 721-22 (1999) (citing I MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra, § 3.2.3, at 
3:13; III id. § 37.4.1, at 37:10). Nor is it “common practice to make a record or transcript of the proceedings.” 
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV.
703, 721-22 (1999) (citing MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note __, at 640). “Only in a few, specialized types 
of arbitrations do arbitrators routinely craft written decisions—labor arbitrations, international commercial 
arbitrations, and maritime arbitrations.” Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law 
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 721 n.85 (1999) (citing Edward Brunet & Charles B. Craver, 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 324 (1997).
173 See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss It and 
When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 605 (1990); RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 313-
375 (2d ed. 1996); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-70 (___); 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19-21 (1921); Roscoe Pound, Remarks On 
Status of The Rule of Judicial Precedent, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 328-32 (1940).
174 See ELIAS MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 60-64 (1895).
See also CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 97 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 
Selden Society 1974) (“Equity “followeth the law in all particular cases where right and Justice requireth.”); 
Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., The Spirit of Equity, 16 B.U. L. REV. 345, 346 (1936) (recognizing a maxim that “equity 
acts according to established rules”).
Commentators disagree about the extent to which Equity interfered with the Common Law or abated its 
rigors. Sir William Blackstone, citing instances where Equity did not interfere, concludes therefrom that Equity 
had no such power. His language is: “It is said that it is the business of a court of equity in England to abate the 
rigor of the common law. But no such power is contended for. Hard was the case of a bond creditor whose debtor 
devised away his real estate; rigorous and unjust the rule which put the devisee in a better condition than the heir; 
yet a court of equity had no power to interfere. Hard is the common law still subsisting that land devised or 
descending to the heir should not be liable to simple contract debts of the ancestor or devisor, although the money 
was laid out in the purchase of the very land; and that the father shall never immediately succeed as heir to the real 
estate of the son. But a court of equity can give no relief, though in both these instances the artificial reason of the 
law, arising from feudal principles, has long since ceased.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND ___ (P. 430) (17__).
Professor Pomeroy’s caustic response to Blackstone:
“The statement in this quotation that “equity had no power to interfere,” is merely a gratuitous assumption; it 
certainly had the same power to interfere which it possessed and exercised in the case of an obligor who had paid 
the debt secured by his bond but had neglected to take a release. The most that can be truthful said is, that “equity 
did not interfere.” Blackstone, being purely a common law, had little knowledge of equity, and his authority 
concerning its principles and jurisdiction was never great…. This is one example among many of Blackstone’s 
utter inability to comprehend the real spirit and workings of the English law. That equity did to a large extent 
interfere with and prevent the practical operation of legal rules, and did thus furnish to suitors a corrective of the 
harshness and injustice of the common law, history and the very existing system incontestably show; and that the 
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very purpose of a separate system was to correct or to mitigate injustices 
caused by the rigor of the Common Law.175 The root of Equity was the idea 
that the law should be administered fairly, not mechanically and the rigors 
of the common law were thus subject to the equitable principles of 
conscience, equity, good faith, and honesty.176 Thus there are numerous 
cases in which equity appears as little more than a canon for the 
interpretation of the rules of Law.177 In other case Chancery might use 
equity to render a verdict that compromised the Law, or “split the baby.”178
And in still other cases it would simply “correct” the Law.179
In ADR, as well, there may be significant variation from the underlying 
substantive law. Having already mentioned that neutrals are inclined to 
depart from the principles of substantive law to reach a more fair and just 
result,180 it bears further noting that the right to vacate an arbitration 
decision is very limited.181 Mere factual error, and even error of law, 
chancellors, from motives of policy or otherwise, refrained from exercising their reformatory function in certain 
instances, is not, in the face of the historical facts, any argument against the existence of the power.” 1 JOHN 
NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 54 at 55-56 (2d ed. 1892). 
Justice Story wrote of the varying interpretations of this maxim: “It may mean that equity adopts and follows 
the rules of law in all cases, to which those rules may, in terms, be applicable; or it may mean, that equity, in 
dealing with cases of an equitable nature, adopts and follows the analogies furnished by the rules of law. Now, the 
maxim is true in both of these senses, as applied to different cases and different circumstances. It is universally 
true in neither sense; or rather, it is not of universal application.” 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 64 at 54 (12th ed. 1877). See also NORMAN FETTER, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 
15 at 33 (1895) (the maxim’s chief use has been stated to be the anticipation of a hasty generalization on the part 
of the student that equity wantonly disregards the provisions of the common and statute law.”).
175
 The Common Law reflected the primary importance of certainty in the administration of the law. Writs 
and forms of action created a determinate system that reflected the influence of ancient institutions, the motives of 
policy, and a felt necessity for rules that regulated those circumstances commonly present in typical human 
confrontations. 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 66 at 68-70 (2d ed. 1892). 
The system recognized a finite number of wrongs, and permitted no deviation from the particular modes of 
procedure and proof. The Chancellor had “the right and the powers, in fact, to do as he likes, whatever hard law 
and still harder practice may dictate.” Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 89 (1934). Sir Henry Maine wrote that equity is “one of the agencies by which law is 
brought into harmony with society.”
176 See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 385, at 524 (2d ed. 1892) 
(“[I]t is undeniable that courts of equity do not recognize and protect the equitable rights of litigant parties, unless 
such rights are, in pursuance of the settled juridical notions of morality, based upon conscience and good faith.”); 
“Bona Fides,” Equity Imported into Common Law, 69 SOLICITOR’S J. & WKLY. RPTR. 339, 339 (Feb. 14, 1925) 
(recognizing an “imaginary residuum of equitable principles, to secure redress of legal abuses”).
177 See J.L. Barton, Equity in the Medieval Common Law, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 139, __ (Ralph A. Newman, ed. 1973).
178
[T]here are many cases in which a simple judgment for either party, without qualifications or conditions, or 
peculiar arrangements, will not do entire justice ex æquo et bono to either party. Some modifications of the 
rights of both parties may be required; some restraints on one side, or on the other, or perhaps on both sides; 
some adjustments involving reciprocal obligations, or duties; some compensatory, or preliminary, or 
concurrent proceedings to fix, control, or equalize rights; some qualifications or conditions, present or future, 
temporary or permanent, to be annexed to the exercise of rights, or the redress of injuries.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 27 at 19 (12th ed. 1877).
179 FONBLANQUE ON EQUITY (b. 1, c. 1, § 3) (“For no man can be obliged to anything contrary to the law of 
nature; and indeed, no man in his senses can be presumed willing to oblige another to it”). 
This rather expansive view of Equity is typical of characterizations of the system of Equity prior to the 
Reformation. The expansiveness of Equity’s authority is in fact the subject of considerable debate. See nn. ___ 
supra and accompanying text.
180 See, nn. __, supra and accompanying text.
181
 The Federal Arbitration Act provides:
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typically do not suffice to upset an award.182 Under the Federal Arbitration 
Act, an arbitrator’s determination is to be enforced absent a showing of 
“manifest disregard” of the law.183
Both of these alternative systems thus enjoy some flexibility in 
moderating the application of the substantive law to the parties that appear 
before them. Neither system, however, claims to override the law or 
judgments of their respective formal counterparts. By acting in personam, 
Equity could compel a person to perform a duty without directly 
challenging or altering the defendant’s property rights (as determined 
otherwise by the Law) and without regard to any contrary judgment 
rendered in the Law courts.184
Equity does not intend to set aside what is right and just, nor does it try to pass 
judgment on a ‘strict Common Law rule’ by claiming that the latter was not 
well made. It merely states that, in the interest of a truly effective and fair 
Administration of Justice, the ‘strict Common Law’ is not to be observed in 
some particular instance.185
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in an and for the district wherein the award was made 
may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration—
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made….
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
182
The conventional wisdom is that successful challenges to arbitration awards are rare. Thirty years ago one 
commentator could write that in the overwhelming majority of that miniscule portion which are appealed, 
only an infinitesimal few have ever been vacated. In more recent years, the amount of “litigious wrangling” 
over the enforcement of awards—and thus the number of successful challenges—has unquestionably 
incrased, so as to make that something of an overstatement. Nonetheless the essential point about judicial 
deference to arbitral awards still appears to be valid.
ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE 
OF LAWYERS 731 (3rd ed. 2002). Accord IV IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.1.4 at 40:13 (1994) (“Over the years, the courts have taken a fairly uniform 
approach to awards: Awards should be confirmed and enforced as is unless there is clear evidence of a gross 
impropriety.”)
183 Wilko v. Swan, 34 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). See also Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, __ & n.136 (1987) (citing Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi 
Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th Cir.) (refusing to vacate arbitral award in case where “arbitrators’ decision 
does not clearly delineate the law applied, nor expound the reasoning and analysis used”), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
2249 (1986); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-16 (2d Cir. 1972) (carefully distinguishing 
between mistaken constructions of law and manifest disregard of the law); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 
466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (“arbitrator’s decision must be upheld unless it is ‘completely irrational.’” 
(quoting Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382 (1972)); Sidarma Societa Italiana Di Armamento Spa., Venice v. 
Holt Marine Ind., 515 F. Supp. 1302, 1308-09 (S.D.N.Y.) (requiring difficiult to prove deliberate or intentional 
disregard of the law in order to come within manifest disregard review), aff’d, 681 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Some courts will reverse an arbitrator’s awards for straying outside the law. The Third Circuit recently 
refused to enforce an arbitrator’s award that “comported with the arbitrator’s view of fairness,” rather than 
drawing its essence from the applicable collective bargaining agreement. CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper, 
Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Eneregy Workers Intl. Union Local No. 2-991, ____, No. 03-1503 (3d Cir. Oct. 
14, 2004).
184 EDMUND H.T. SNELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 40-43 (18th ed. 1920); ELIAS MERWIN, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 72-79 (1895)
185
 Anton Hermann Chroust, The “Common Good” and the Problem of “Equity” in the Philosophy of Law 
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Moreover, Equity’s decision had no precedential effect even in Equity, 
much less in Law.186
Similarly, ADR stands in the shadow of the substantive law yet resorts 
to another regime to resolve the dispute among the parties before them.187
Mediators, for example, “do not ‘judge’; they aid the parties in ending a 
dispute.”188 Arbitrators, too, are informed by their “experience, knowledge 
of the customs of the trade and fair and good sense for equitable relief.”189
After all, the early definition of an arbitration is “a deciding, according to 
one’s will or pleasure; uncontrolled or absolute decision.”190 An ADR 
neutral thus may facilitate or impose a resolution that neither comports with 
nor undermines the dominant substantive principles. And that resolution, 
too, has no precedential effect. While liberating, this ability to act “in 
personam” is also limiting. ADR cannot establish the precedential effect 
that may be useful in some circumstances.191 Equity suffered the same 
infirmity.192
One final similarity bears mention. Both Equity and ADR recognized 
certain limits to their equitable competency. Equity didn’t correct all 
injustices. In fact, Equity left untouched, in full force and operation, a great 
number of legal rules which were certainly as harsh, unjust, and 
unconscientious as any of those which they did attack.193 In a similar way, 
of St. Thomas Aquinas, 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 114, 117 (1942–1943)
186 See n. __ infra and accompanying text.
187
 Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 26 (1987).
188
 Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 26 (1987).
189
 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 703, 721 n.83(1999) (emphasis added) (citing I GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION § 25.01 at 391 (rev. ed. 1995)).
See also Colin P. Campbell, The Court of Equity—A Theory of its Jurisdiction, 15 GREEN BAG 108, 111 
(1903) (equity can “recognize and enforce principles which actually govern society in general, whether embodied 
in the so-called rules of law or not.”).
190
 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 426 (1971) (quoting the “obsolete” definition). The contemporary 
definition is equally telling. It reads: “The settlement of a dispute or question at issue by one to whom the 
conflicting parties agree to refer their claims in order to obtain an equitable decision.” Id. (emphasis added). In 
Black’s Dictionary, the reference to a substantive baseline is conspicuously absent. See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY ___ (8th ed. 2004) (“A process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders 
a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard.”).
Note the use of the word in arbitration in Professor Pomeroy’s admonition about the dangers of a far-
reaching jurisprudence of Equity:
An accurate conception of equity is indispensable to the due administration of justice. If a certain theory of its 
nature, which now prevails to some extent, should become universal, it would soon destroy all sense of 
certainty and security which the citizen has, and should have, in respect to the existence and maintenance of 
his juridical rights…. It needs no argument to show that if this notion should become universally accepted as 
the true definition of equity, every decision would be a virtual arbitration, and all certainty in legal rules and 
security of legal rights would be lost.
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 43 at 44 (2d ed. 1892).
191 See, e.g., Donald J. Friedman & Michael D. Broaddus, Computer Contract Disputes in the 1990s: 
Choosing ADR or Litigation, 5 No. 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 6 (1993).
192 EDMUND H.T. SNELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 40-43 (18th ed. 1920); ELIAS MERWIN, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 72-79 (1895)
193
 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 50 at 50-51 (2d ed. 1892) (“It is 
absolutely certain from all the existing records, and from the result itself of their work, that they did not refrain 
from deciding any particular case, according to their views of equity and good conscience, merely because the 
doctrine which they followed or established in making the decision was inconsistent with the rule of law 
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the ADR movement has not suggested that every legal dispute has a non-
judicial solution. Indeed, the ADR literature recognizes that some types of 
cases are not suited to resolution outside the courtroom, including 
particularly cases in which the plaintiff seeks a declaration of law by the 
court.194
4. The Reflection and Reinforcement of Community Norms
Another motive fueling interest in ADR is its ability to enhance 
“community involvement in the dispute resolution process.”195 This 
involvement takes two forms. First, ADR empowers neighborhoods to 
resolve disputes that are not cognizable in or are otherwise ignored by 
formal dispute resolution systems.196 And second, ADR incorporates local 
values and norms into the decision-making calculus.197 These values and 
norms tend to emphasize compromise, reconciliation and fairness.198 Thus 
while formal adjudication can be “a fight unto death in which irreparable 
harm (economic, psychological, and spiritual) is done to parties,” ADR 
respects “compromise and human growth” rooted in fundamental moral and 
spiritual principles.199
The excesses of adversarialism, the importance of reaching the merits, 
and a morally-infused understanding of justice have already been discussed 
in section A of this Part II and in previous subparts of this section B. The 
applicable to the same facts, nor because the law had deliberately and intentionally refused to acknowledge the 
existence of a primary right, or to give a remedy under those facts and circumstances. That this corrective 
authority was possessed by the chancellors, and freely exercised by them in the periods of which I am speaking, is 
recognized by the ancient writers.”); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 
(noting that among the legal rules with which equity did not interfere: The doctrine by which the lands of a debtor 
were generally exempted from all liability for his simple contract debts); Earl of Bath v. Sherwin, 10 Mod. 4 (“A 
collateral warranty was certainly one of the harshest and most cruel parts of the common law, because there was 
no such pretended recompense (as in the case of a lineal warranty); yet I do not find that the court (of chancery) 
ever gave satisfaction.”)
194 See nn. __ and accompanying text, infra.
195 LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED 
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH 
RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003) (“To 
improve public satisfaction with the justice system; … To restore the influence of neighborhood and community 
values and the cohesiveness of communities.”)
196 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of 
Innovation Co-Opted or “The Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (recounting the history of 
neighborhood justice centers); ROMAN TOMASIC & MALCOLM M. FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: 
ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA (1982); DANIEL MCGILLIS, COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
197 See generally Valerie A. Sanchez, Back to the Future of ADR: Negotiating Justice and Human Needs, 18 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2003).
198 See generally Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 
(1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now a Word About Secular Humanism, Spirituality, and the Practice of 
Justice and Conflict Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1073 (2001).
199
 Joseph Allegretti, A Christian Perspective on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997 
(2001) (citing Robert D. Taylor, Toward a Biblical Theology of Litigation: A Law Professor Looks at 1 Cor. 6:1-
11, 2 EX AUDITU 105, 109 (1986); Wayne D. Brazil, The Attorney as Victim: Toward More Candor About the 
Psychological Price Tag of Litigation Practice, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 107 (1978-1979)).
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reflection and reinforcement of community norms also raises issues of 
access to courts; those issues are addressed immediately in subpart 5, infra.
5. Access to Justice
Proponents of ADR also emphasize the system’s ability to broaden 
access to justice.200 ADR initiatives can improve access to justice for 
individuals lacking the means and wherewithal to overcome the 
intimidating and confusing setting of courtroom or to navigate the formal 
rules of procedure and evidence.201
The recourse to legal actors and proceedings is costly, emotionally 
debilitating, and potentially counterproductive. In many respects, justice has 
become an empty façade; the august wisdom and high-minded discipline of 
the law merely create an appearance of dispensing what is right and just 
among parties in dispute. Although adjudication provides coercive finality to 
conflicts, the pathway to justice is dehumanizing and riddled with abusive 
interpretations of the truth.202
ADR becomes the means for enabling “access to justice” when adjudication
fails.203
Equity was similarly concerned with access issues, and asserted 
jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against defendants who were too 
powerful locally for justice to be obtainable against them by regular 
means.204 Indeed, one commentator referred to this as “[t]he most important 
of the judicial functions of the Chancellor.”205 Access to Chancery was 
facilitated by a simple procedure.206 And whereas Chancery charged a fee 
for obtaining writ, there was no fee in Equity.207
200 LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED 
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998).  See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH 
RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003) (“To 
provide accessible forums to people with disputes; To teach the public to try more effective processes than 
violence or ligiation for settling disputes”).
201 See generally Larry R. Spain, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Poor: Is It An Alternative?, 70 N.D. 
L. REV. 269 (1994).
202 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND 
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1 (1989).
203
 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 244-45 (1995); Leonard S. Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the 
Adversary System, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 48 (1976).
204
 J. L. Barton, Equity in the Medieval Common Law, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 140, 145-46 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1973).
205
 Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 93 
(1934) (“Most of the early petitions seem to have originated in the fact that the defendant was so rich or so 
powerful that he could not be brought into court in the usual way. The phrase “he is of too great a maintenance” is 
often found in these bills. The early equity jurisprudence appears to have consisted of cases where, although there 
might have been a remedy at law, yet because the petitioner was poor and the defendant was rich and powerful, 
the legal remedy was not satisfactory.”). See also Vance, Law in Action in Mediaeval England, 17 VA. L. REV. 1.
206 See nn. __ supra.
207
 Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 88 (1934).
E.g., John Feyrewyn v. Richard the Carpenter, 30 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT BILLS IN EYRE 6 (1292). It is 
addressed to Sir John de Berewick (one of the King’s Justiciars), “you who are put in the place of our Lord 
the King to do right to poor and rich.” The plaintiff, of Shrewsbury, says that he paid the defendant six marks, 
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III. TRADITIONAL LAW AND EQUITY—THE DIALECTIC IN PRACTICE
Much of the grand history of Anglo-American law could be 
characterized as an epic struggle between the regimes of law and equity.208
We revere law and the rule of law yet contrive to avoid legalism.209 That the 
law must be applied uniformly may be “the most basic principle of 
jurisprudence.”210 Yet a right too rigid hardens into wrong.211 Equity plays a 
strange role in the structure of law; separate from, and yet a part of the legal 
norms.212 As complements and as rivals, separate systems of Law and 
Equity combined to administer the laws for centuries with both certainty 
and discretion.213
The king’s courts and the Law courts could have maintained some 
flexibility and liberality by simply accepting the new writs that were issued 
receiving in return the defendant’s undertaking in writing to furnish plaintiff, who was getting ready to go to 
the Holy Land on pilgrimage, with board and loding meanwhile. But the wicked defendant will not keep his 
agreement; instead of which he only gives plaintiff occasionally a morsel of bread just as if plaintiff were a 
pauper begging alms for God’s sake. Unless his Lordship helps the plaintiff before he (his Lordship) leaves 
town, plaintiff will never get his money back, for the defendant is clerk of the bailiff of Shrewsbury, and the 
rich folk of  this town all work together to keep the poor from getting their rights. Plaintiff has no money to 
hire a pleader, but if his Lordship will graciously see to it that plaintiff gets his money back, the latter will set
out for the Holy Land, and there he will pray for the King and for his Lordship also.
Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760 n.17 (1945).
208
. See generally ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54 (rev. ed. 1954) 
(“Almost all of the problems of jurisprudence come down to a fundamental one of rule and discretion, of 
administration of justice by law and administration of justice by the more or less trained intuition of experienced 
magistrates”); KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 17 (1969) (“Every 
governmental and legal system in world history has involved both rules and discretion. No government has ever 
been a government of laws and not of men in the sense of eliminating all discretionary power. Every government 
has always been a government of laws and of men.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 
24–25 (1990) (“[F]or more than two millennia, the field of jurisprudence has been fought over by two distinct 
though variegated groups. One contends that law is more than politics and in the hands of skillful judges 
yields . . . correct answers to even the most difficult legal questions. The other contends that law is politics 
through and through and that judges exercise broad discretionary authority.”). See also BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, 
PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE, RELIGION, HISTORY, LAW, AND LITERATURE 163-193 (1983).
209
 Lord Justice Evershed, Equity After Fusion: Federal or Confederate, THE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF 
PUBLIC TEACHERS OF LAW 171, 171 (1948).
210
. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982). See also BENJAMIN 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921); GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE 173 n.13 
(Edinburgh ed., 1952) (“the worst misfortune of a civilized people is doubt about the impartiality of justice”) 
(internal citation and quotation omitted); GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 25–27 (1988).
211
 Charles D. Frierson, A Certain Fundamental Difference in Viewpoint Between Law and Equity as 
Illustrated by Two Maxims, 22 CASE & COMMENT 403, 405 (1915). See JOHN SALMOND, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 97-98 (1893); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 303 (2nd ed. 1921); H. 
Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 809 (1961) (“Morality must 
form a part of our legal norms unless we are prepared to discard our moral convictions at the points of strain at 
which moral insights are most needed.”); Harlan F. Stone, Book Review, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (1918).
212
 G. Radbruch, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft 75 (9th ed. 1952) (“The dilemma that equity is to be 
better than justice and yet not quite opposed to justice, but rather a kind of justice, has troubled men as early as 
Aristotle’s famous chapter V 14 of the Nichomachean Ethics.”). See generally Ralph A. Newman, Introduction in 
EQUITY IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 15, 15-16 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1973).
213
. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 17 (Chaytor ed. 1909) (“[F]or 
two centuries before the year 1875 the two systems had been working together harmoniously”).
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by the Chancery.214 Had the Law courts accepted these necessary 
innovations, instead of becoming bemused by form and precedent, there 
may have been no need for the creation of a special, competing court and an 
alternative system of law.215 Instead, the common law became a narrow, 
formalistic system, confined to the method of granting relief by the award 
of damages after an injury had been suffered.216 Other, preventive or special 
relief was not available from the common law courts.217 Practical 
circumstances demanded some adaptability and elasticity, and Chancery 
filled that void.
English law was thus split into dual systems, with equity and law 
flowing in separate channels. By requiring the specific performance of 
contracts, enjoining the repetition of a trespass or nuisance, appointing a 
receiver to prevent a defendant from destroying property that was the 
subject of an action, or ordering an accounting, Equity supplemented the 
Common Law.218 These and many other remedies considered essential to 
the administration of any meaningful system of justice were simply 
unavailable in the Law Courts. By contrast, Equity had at its disposal a 
broad array of remedies to redress a given wrong.
[C]ourts of common law cannot give the desired relief. They have no forms of 
remedy adapted to the objects. They can entertain suits only in a prescribed 
form, and they can give a general judgment only in the prescribed form.219
From their very character and organization they are incapable of the remedy, 
which the mutual rights and relative situations of the parties, under the 
circumstances, positively require…. But courts of equity are not so restrained. 
Although they have prescribed forms of proceeding, the latter are flexible, and 
may be suited to the different postures of cases. They may adjust their decrees, 
so as to meet most, if not all, of these exigencies; and they may vary, qualify, 
restrain, and model the remedy, so as to suit it to mutual and adverse claims, 
controlling equities; and the real and substantial rights of all the parties.”220
In this regard, Equity was but a useful “appendix” to the common law.221
214 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
215
 Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 36 (1951). One 
commentator has suggested that the law-equity dialectic, though causal, was working in the opposite direction. 
See “Bona Fides,” Equity Imported into Common Law, 69 SOLICITOR’S J. & WKLY. RPTR. 339, 340 (Feb. 14, 
1925) (“The result of the growth of equity was that the equitable development of the Common Law was nipped in 
the bud.”).
216 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
217
 Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 36 (1951).
218
. See WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 28 (1930) (describing purpose of uses was to avoid 
the rigors of the common law which forbad testamentary gifts of land as well as inter vivos transfers except by 
livery of seisin); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 4–7 (Chaytor ed. 1909); 
Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171 (1936).
219 MITFORD, EQUITY PLEADING 3-4 (Jeremy, ed. ___); 1 WOODES., LECTURES vii, 203-206.
220
 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 27 at 19 (12th ed. 1877).
221
. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 19 (Chaytor ed. 1 909) (“I do 
not think that any one has expounded or ever will expound equity as a single, consistent system, an articulate body 
of law. It is a collection of appendixes between which there is no very close connection.”).
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Yet the conflict between the two systems was palpable.222 The very 
growth of equity, as long as it was in its formative period, was from its 
essential nature an antagonism to the common law, either by way of 
restraining the prosecution of actions at law, by adding doctrines and rules 
which the law simply did not contain, or by way of negating rights that the 
law had settled.223 Of course, Equity did not restrain a judge or officer of 
the Law Courts.224 Nor did Equity deny the operation of the rules of law.225
It sought only to neutralize them by compelling the defendant to relinquish 
the benefits of those rules in accordance with its decree.226 In this narrow 
sense, then, law and equity did not “conflict.”227 But in the broader sense it 
is not even “fairly open to question” that Equity summoned a higher law 
and adopted doctrines directly contrary to the Law courts.228
A.  Equity’s Reforming Influence on the Law Courts
Although Law and Equity operated as dual systems for centuries, Equity 
had an undeniable reforming influence on the Law courts.229 This section 
offers many examples of instances where doctrines and rules that were once 
exclusively recognized and enforced by Chancery were incorporated into 
the Law whether by statute or by judicial decision. Indeed, over time the 
Common Law became increasingly “equitized.”230 The enumeration of 
several examples serves two purposes. First, from an evidentiary 
perspective, they illustrate the dialectic of law and equity in operation. 
222
 Conflicts of jurisdiction “went on, constantly increasing, till at last, they produced an explosion which 
shook Westminster Hall to its center.” 2 CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 317 (4th ed. 1856); see 
also JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 44 (5th ed. 1941); BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 17-18 
(7th ed. 1905); POTTER, HISTORY OF EQUITY 11, 13 (1931).
223
 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 48 at 49 (2d ed. 1892) (“It would 
be a downright absurdity, a flat contradiction to the plainest teachings of history, to deny that the process of 
building up the system of equity involved and required on the part of the chancellors an evasion, disregard, and 
even open violation of many established rules of the common law.”); Harlan F. Stone, Book Review, 18 
COLUMBIA L. REV. 97 (1918) (“[I]t seems extraordinary that any writer should ever have asserted broadly that 
there was no conflict between the doctrines of law and equity.”) See also Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the 
New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244 (1945); Hohfeld, The Relation Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. REV. 537 
(1913); Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 326 (1846); BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 151 (1916).
224 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
225 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
226 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
227 FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 16-18 (1920); Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 58 (1887); James B. Ames, Purchase 
for Value Without Notice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1887).
228
 Harlan Fiske Stone, Book Review, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 97, 98 (1918). See also nn. __, supra.
229
 George Palmer Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 32 (1924-25) (“The Common Law has 
plagiarized many things from Chancery.”).
230
 7 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 74, 75 (1926). See also Brendan F. 
Brown, Lord Hardwicke and the Science of Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325 (1935-1936); 1 JOHN 
NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 69 at 73-74 (2d ed. 1892).
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Second, they illustrate the positive role that equity can play in the moral 
growth of the law.231
In the early stages of English law, certain agreements could be enforced 
only if the instrument sought to be enforced respected certain formalities, 
oftentimes a seal.232 The formalities served channeling and cautionary 
functions,233 but also served as a bright-line test for the early Law judges, 
who had very little discretion.234 Promises that were not enforceable in Law, 
however, could be enforced in Equity.235 Equity, “the sometimes moral 
policeman of the law,” looked beyond the mere form of a transaction.236
Recognizing the sanctity of contract, and the resulting moral obligation to 
honor one’s promises, Equity could enforce the promise otherwise 
unenforceable.237 In response to the more evolved position of Chancery, and 
in fear of losing a competitive advantage,238 the Law courts ultimately 
developed and expanded the action of Assumpsit to enforce a range of 
promises, including unsealed and oral promises.239
The formalities of contract law had also bound the Law courts to a rule 
that allowed a creditor to recover a second time from a debtor who had paid 
his debt in full but had neglected to obtain a formal release or a surrender of 
the contract.240
231
 E. Hocking, The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights 2 (1926); O. Holmes, The Path of 
the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (“The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its 
history is the history of the moral development of the race.”)
232 JAMES B. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 98 (1913); Frederick E. Crane, The Magic of the Private 
Seal, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 24 (1915); Harold D. Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of Early English Law, 10 COLUM. 
L. REV. 608 (1910); Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality, 29 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 617 (1993).
233 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.16 at 86-87 (3d ed. 1999); Lon Fuller, Consideration and 
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-03 (1941).
234
 Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation—Tension Between the 
Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 509, 522-23 (2004).
235
 Charles D. Frierson, A Certain Fundamental Difference in Viewpoint Between Law and Equity as 
Illustrated by Two Maxims, 22 CASE & COMMENT 403, 412 (1915) (“Let us not forget the court of chancery was 
the first to ignore the absence of a seal….”). See also 5 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 294-97 (7th ed. 1956); WILLARD T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY 16 
(1914).
236
 John McCarthy, Contemporary Advocacy: Value Free?, 38 CATH. LAW. 25, 38 (1998).
237 See generally Val D. Ricks, Contract Law and Christian Conscience, 2003 BYU L. REV. 993.
238
 Willard T. Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL 
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prompted by the strong desire to retain jurisdiction that was fast slipping away.”); 2 WILLIAM SEARLE 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 456 (noting that the “competition of chancellor” awakened “even 
the most conservative common law to the necessity of endeavouring to meet demands.”)
239 See, e.g., Slade’s Case, 4 COKE REPORT 92b, 76 ER 1074 (KB 1602) (presuming existence of a promise 
from the fact of a debt and allowing Assumpsit to be brought on a simple promise to pay money). See generally 
Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1182 (1961); James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 
18th-Century English Contract Theory: The View from Lord Mansfield’s Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1950-55 
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If he had paid without either getting an acquittance or having his bond 
returned to him, he would have to pay again, not … because this result was in 
itself desired, but because “the general grounds of the law of England heed 
more what is good for many than what is good for one singular person 
only..”241
The Common Law rule was that a sealed instrument could be discharged 
only by another instrument of as high a character, or else by a surrender of 
it so that the creditor could make profert of the instrument.242 A debtor 
facing this situation could seek relief in Equity. The Chancellor would issue 
an injunction against the creditor, enjoining him from enforcing the legal 
judgment.243 Ultimately, the Law courts relaxed their jurisprudence to 
incorporate such defenses as accord and satisfaction; these reforms ensured 
a greater uniformity of results in Law as in Equity.244
Equity allowed recovery upon a lost instrument. Formalities in contract, 
again the doctrine of profert in particular, also precluded a creditor from 
enforcing an instrument that had been accidentally lost or destroyed.245 By 
the formalities of the common law, the document was the debt;246 hence 
there was no notion of secondary evidence of contents.247 Because Equity 
could shape its remedial processes to meet any new emergency, it acquired 
jurisdiction in this class of cases, and for a long time all suits upon such lost 
negotiable paper were necessarily brought in equity. 248 The courts of Law 
ultimately abrogated the ancient requirement of profert and, as in Equity, 
allowed actions to recover a money judgment upon lost obligations or 
negotiable instruments to be brought in courts of law according to the legal 
modes of procedure.249
Equity introduced a moral view on the enforcement of penalties and 
forfeitures.250 The Law courts rigidly exacted all penalties and enforced the 
forfeitures of bonds issued in amounts considerably larger than the sum 
borrowed unless the payment was done at precisely the time and in 
241 S.F.C MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 250 (2d ed. 1981) (quoting ST. 
GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, Dialogue I, c.12 (Selden Society, vol. 91, pp. 77-79)).
242
 Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21, 
32 (1919-1920).
243
 Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21, 
32 (1919-1920).
244
 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 70 at 74-75 (2d ed. 1892).
245
 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 72 at 76-77 (2d ed. 1892).
246
 Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21, 
32 (1919-1920).
247 See generally Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. 
REV. 753 (1945); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 6–7 (Chaytor ed. 1909); 
William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 483–86 (1938) (discussing “the reforming 
influence of equity”).
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 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 71 at 76 (2d ed. 1892).
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 1 GEORGE SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 630 (1845).
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precisely the manner that had been stipulated.251 Yet penalties and 
forfeitures of all types were avoidable in Equity.252 Equity looked beyond 
the form of the transaction and to its substance.253 It gave the creditor an 
amount that was just and equitable, usually principal, interest, and expenses 
incurred by the creditor, 254 but would “restrain the creditor from suing at 
law for the amount of the bond, on the ground that such a course was 
unconscientious and oppressive.”255 Equity gradually extended this doctrine 
to contracts other than those requiring the payment of money.256 These 
equitable doctrines were slowly absorbed into the Common Law.257
Chancery assumed jurisdiction under any circumstances where the 
remedy at law was not plain, adequate and complete.258 Hence there are 
many other cases where Equity would intervene. Doctrines with respect to 
fraud, undue influence, duress and mistake all originated in Equity.259
Equity also created the remedies of cancellation, restitution, and specific 
performance.260 The protection by injunction of public or social rights is 
derivative of Equity.”261 And the modern law of fiduciary duties, unfair 
competition, trademarks, and business rights was developed in the Chancery 
courts.262
Chancery also intervened when the procedures of the law courts were 
inadequate. For example, equity interfered in the name—and with the 
imprimatur—of efficiency to avoid the injurious effects of a multiplicity of 
actions.263 Describing the contrast between law and equity in these 
instances, Professor Chafee wrote:
251
 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 72 at 76-77 (2d ed. 1892).
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A common-law action soon came to be a two-sided affair, usually with only 
one plaintiff and one defendant but sometimes with several plaintiffs or 
defendants tightly bound together as joint obligees or obligors, etc. Except in 
such joint situations, however, a dispute of one person against many persons 
usually had to come before the law courts, if at all, in the form of many 
separate actions. Hence it was far cheaper and more convenient to have a 
single suit in chancery, which was accustomed to handle polygonal 
controversies . . . . [I]t was an obvious waste of time to try . . . common 
question[s] of law and fact over and over in separate actions at law . . . . It was 
much more economical to get everybody into a single chancery suit and settle 
the common questions once and for all.264
Thus, a court of equity would hear a controversy to prevent a multiplicity of 
suits, even if the exercise of such jurisdiction called for adjudication on 
purely legal rights and to confer purely legal relief.265 Moreover, when the 
number of plaintiffs or defendants were too numerous to join in a single 
suit, equity would permit a few of the litigants to represent the many in 
connection with an equitable bill of peace, the ancestor of the contemporary 
class action.266
In reforming the law of property, Equity recognized ownership in the 
beneficiary of a trust. At common law, title to tangible real property could 
pass only by livery of seisin, which generally required the physical presence 
of the parties on the land.267 Thus, in a conveyance to A for the use of B, the 
Law courts denied any claim of title in B and refused to recognize that B 
four types of cases involving a multiplicity of actions—(i) where the nature of the wrong is such that at law it 
would be necessary for the injured party, in order to obtain complete relief, to bring a number of actions, arising 
from the same wrongful act against the same wrongdoer; (ii) where a party institutes, or is about to institute, a 
number of successive or simultaneous actions against another party, all depending upon the same legal questions 
and similar issues of fact; (iii) where a party claims a common right against a number of persons, the 
establishment of which would require a separate legal action brought by him against each of such persons, and 
which are of such a nature that they might be determined in a single suit in equity brought against all of such 
persons; and (iv) where a number of persons have separate and distinct rights of action against the same party, 
arising from the same cause, governed by the same legal rule, and involving similar facts, and the circumstances 
are such that the rights of all may be settled in a single suit. See generally 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A 
TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§ 243–275, at 318–377 (2d ed. 1892). References herein to a 
“multiplicity of actions” refer to group (iv). See also HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
EQUITY § 178 (2d ed. 1948) (“the plight of a defendant at law, subjected to one hundred and ten separate actions 
arising from the same accident, many of the actions being brought in different counties and some of them set for 
trial in the different counties at the same time, so that it would be impossible for the witnesses for the defense to 
attend each trial, is one that calls for some sort of relief if it can be given”) (citing S. Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 47 So. 
274 (1908)).
264
. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200–01 (1950).
265
. Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 79 WASH. L. REV. 429, 492 (2003) 
(citations omitted).
266
. See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 269, at 367-68 (2d ed. 
1892) (“[T]he jurisdiction may and should be exercised, either on behalf of a numerous body of separate claimants 
against a single party, or on behalf of a single party against such a numerous body, although there is no ‘common 
title,’ nor ‘community of right’ or of ‘interest in the subject-matter,’ among these individuals, but where there is 
and because there is merely a community of interest among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the 
general controversy, or in the kind and form of relief demanded and obtained by or against each individual 
member of the numerous body.”). See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO 
THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200 (1950).
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had any right therein.268 In fact, B could be sued at Law for trespass in 
taking the rents and profits. Equity, however, recognized B as the beneficial 
owner, held A to be a mere trustee for B, and would enjoin A from 
prosecuting any action at law against B. “This recognized the principles of 
trusts, which in its many phases equity has always fostered.”269 (Equity 
similarly respected a trust with regard to tangible personal property, and 
also the right to transfer title to intangible personalty, or choses in 
action.270) Equity’s action in the development of uses practically eliminated 
most of the obsolete doctrines of feudalism after feudalism ceased to exist 
as an active social and governmental system. This led directly to the 
enactment of the Statute of Uses. Although aimed at restoring tax revenues 
to Henry VIII, the Statute made it possible to convey legal title by written 
deed, replacing conveyances by livery of seisin, and to create future 
executory estates impossible under the old law. The Statute also destroyed 
the power to devise land by will recognized by Equity, and resulted in the 
adoption of the Statute of Willis to restore such power.271
The theory of mortgages is a direct result of the carrying over into the 
law of the principles established by the Chancellor’s Court in the early part 
of the seventeenth century. Equity, though recognizing the purely technical 
legal title of the mortgagee, enforced the real ownership of the mortgagor 
by establishing his equity of redemption, and by charging the mortgagee as 
a trustee if he exercised his legal right to take over possession of the 
mortgaged property and collected the rents and profits. Equity treated the 
legal title and right of possession as existing in the mortgagee only for the 
purpose of establishing and protecting his security for payment of the 
mortgage debt.272
B.  The Ossification of Equity 
(or The Common Law’s Reforming Influence on Equity)
What starts as a boon often ends as a boomerang.273 Earnest, “[s]imple, 
inexpensive and speedy in its origins,” by the eighteenth century Equity had 
268
 Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21, 
32 (1919-1920) (citing WILLIAM W. BILLSON, EQUITY IN ITS RELATIONS TO COMMON LAW 167 (1917); Kenelm 
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became idly corrupt, “exceedingly complicated, unbelievably slow, and 
inexcusably expensive.”274 When Chancery contracted the pathogens of 
strict law, it suffered a fate worse than that which plagued the Common 
Law.275
In the early seventeenth century, a process of systematization was 
underway.276 For many centuries the sweeping jurisdiction of Equity had 
been untrammeled by any definite rule.277 Equity was a successful 
competitor vis-à-vis the Law courts, and was doing useful things.278 But this 
popularity also brought a craving for certainty; as soon as a system of law 
becomes reduced to completeness of outward form, “it has a natural 
tendency to crystallize into a rigidity unsuited to the free applications which 
the actual circumstances of human life demand.”279 Hence Chancery could 
not remain a “fountain of unlimited dispensations.”280 To reform the 
“heterogeneous medley of empirical remedies,”281 Bacon issued one 
hundred rules of equity that were “wisely conceived, and expressed with the 
greatest precision and perspicuity.”282
Continuing thereafter, particularly under the Chancellorships of Lord 
Nottingham and Lord Hardwicke,283 the exercise of equity became more 
circumscribed and predictable.284 Chancery no longer “decide[d] every 
274
 Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L. REV. 112 (1934).
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chancery doth, so as the example introduce not a general mischief. Every matter, therefore, that happens 
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278 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
279 SHELDON AMOS, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 57 (1875).
280
. Frederick Pollock, The Transformation of Equity, in FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND ETHICS 293 (1882) (Chancery became “as regular a court of jurisdiction as any other”); FREDERIC WILLIAM 
MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 9 (Chaytor ed. 1909) (“In the second half of the sixteenth 
century the jurisprudence of the court is becoming settled.”).
281
. Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 315 (1938).
282
. 2 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF 
ENGLAND 134 (5th ed. 1868) (“They are the foundation of the practice of the Court of Chancery, and are still cited 
as authority.”).
283
. Lord Nottingham served as Lord Chancellor from 1673 to 1682. See generally 4 JOHN CAMPBELL, 
LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 236–79 (5th ed. 1868). Lord 
Hardwicke served from 1736 to 1756. See generally 6 JOHN CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND 
KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 158-304 (5th ed. 1868).
284
. See Walter E. Sparks, The Origin, Growth and Present Scope of Equity Jurisprudence in England and 
the United States, 16 W. JURIST 473, 477 (1882) (“as time passed on . . . opposition gradually diminished”). See, 
e.g., Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 413, 428 (1802) (“The cases which occur are various, but they are decided 
on fixed principles. Courts of equity have in this respect no more discretionary power than courts of law. They 
decide new cases, as they arise, by the principles on which former cases have been decided, and may then 
11-Mar-05 ADR: THE NEW EQUITY 49
individual case according to the result of a sort of ransacking search for the 
particular set of conscientious principles applicable to the case.”285
Chancery began to respect precedent.286 And as Nottingham and Hardwicke 
“deliberately set out to reduce equity to a system of rules established by 
precedent,”287 the jurisdiction of equity “crystallized.”288
But one commentator’s crystallization is another’s ossification. As the 
jurisdiction of equity lost its youthful exuberance, so also its freedom, 
elasticity and luminance.289 Equity lost religion and found procedure.290 The 
administration of equity, much like the administration of law became 
“entangled in the intricacies of its own processes and broken down of its 
own weight.”291 Corruption made things worse.292 For litigants, Chancery 
illustrate or enlarge the operation of those principles; but the principles are as fixed and certain as the principles 
on which the courts of common law proceed.”).
285
. H.G. Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, 45 L.Q. REV. 196, 205 (1929).
286
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became a nightmare. Five years was a minimum for a creditors’ bill to be 
disposed of, even where there was neither exception nor appeal.293
Sometimes a case was delayed over thirty years.294 Chancery thus became a 
jus strictum differing little from the common law except in point of identity 
of the judicial decisions it had made its own.295 Indeed, by the first quarter 
of the nineteenth century, equity had become “so fixed, so certain, that 
lawyers could say, ‘There is nothing new in equity.’”296
This legalization of Equity was happening simultaneously with the 
equitization of the Law described supra.297 The alternative appearance of 
law and equity as the mutual checks and corrections of one another are 
lasting and not transitory phenomena. No longer “discrete conversants,” the 
two systems had “begun to be ‘integrated,’ ‘melded,’ or ‘collapsed’ into 
each other.”298
C.   The Merger of Law and Equity
The merger of law and equity consummated the centuries-long 
relationship of cooperation and competition between the two systems.299
With equity “legalized,” it was assumed that the usefulness of the separate 
court was exhausted.300 Differences between the systems were viewed as 
many equitable cases involved the taking of accounts and enquiries, necessarily made the proceedings more 
lengthy than the general run of common law actions, which turned on a clear cut issue of fact or law.”); Charles 
Synge Christopher & Baron Bowen, Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian Period, in 1 
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516, 529 (1907) (“‘No man, as things now stand,’ says in 
1839 Mr. George Spence, the author of the well-known work on the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of 
Chancery, ‘can enter into a Chancery suit with any reasonable hope of being alive at its termination, if he has a 
determined adversary.’”). A vivid picture of the technicalities, delays, and expense involved in a suit in chancery 
is to be found in the case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, as related in Charles Dickens’ BLEAK HOUSE (Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1956) (1853). Some have suggested that Dickens’ negative depiction is exaggerated. See generally 
WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN (Yale Univ. 1929).
292
 Michael Lobban, Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery, Part II, 
22 LAW & HIST. REV. 565 (2004); Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L. 
REV. 109, 112-113 (1934).
293 COOPER, PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT RELATIVE TO DEFECTS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY 86 (1828) 
as quoted in 9 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 433 (1926).
294
 9 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 375 (1926).
295
. See Douglas M. Gane, The Birth of a New Equity, 67 THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL 572, 572 (1923). See 
also Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke and the Science of Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319, 325 (1935-
1936) (“In the eighteenth century . . . not only was Chancery following the law, but the Common Law in turn was 
becoming more and more equitized.”); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 74–75 
(7th ed. 1956).
296
. Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 106 
(1934).
297
 Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L. REV. 109 (1934) (tracing key 
elements of reforms in Law and Equity to the middle of the eighteenth century).
298
 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 214 (1995) (referring to a theory about the evolution of the systems of ADR and 
formal adjudication).
299
 This story has been narrated. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, ___ (1987); Thomas O. 
Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
300
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merely procedural, and a widespread and escalating contempt for procedure 
suggested that any distinctions were impractical and unnecessary.301 There 
was little tolerance for the delays, the expense, and the technical 
complications that resulted from maintaining separate courts of law and 
equity. 302 Procedure could better fulfill its functional and secondary role if 
a single set of procedural rules facilitated the joint administration of the 
substantive principles of both law and equity.303
I have argued elsewhere that in merging the regimes of law and equity, 
reformers may have swept away part of the wisdom that guided the 
development and operation of dual systems.304 One virtue of an autonomous 
system of equity was its authority to act in opposition to the strict law when 
the unique circumstances of a particular case demanded intervention.305 The
architects of the merger took great pains to sustain this virtue by preserving 
the substantive principles of both law and equity; only the procedure was 
modified, they insisted.306 But even assuming that the antagonistic 
substantive regimes of law and equity can co-exist and be applied 
contemporaneously within a single unified procedural system, a 
fundamental flaw inheres in the procedural infrastructure of a merged 
system.307 For in denying equity any structural autonomy, there remains no 
relief from the procedures of the merged system itself when the modes of 
proceeding in that system are inadequate.308
Separate equity courts were given up because equity had been made into a body of rigid doctrines which were 
applied quite as mechanically as the strict common law. Equity had become a sterile system and showed a 
progressive decadence as an agency able to individualize justice. “The introduction of the common-law 
theory of binding precedents and the result case-law equity…that made equity a system must in the end prove 
fatal to it. In the very act of becoming a system it becomes legalized, and in becoming merely a competing 
system of law insures its ultimate downfall.”
Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244, 246 (1945) (citing SNELL, 
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1868).
301 See generally Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 
(2003).
302
. See William Searle Holdsworth, Blackstone’s Treatment of Equity, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1928-1930). 
See generally Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
303 See Charles E. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1925)Thomas O. Main, 
Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
304 See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
305 See William Searle Holdsworth, The Early History of Equity, 13 MICH. L. REV. 293, 293 (1913) (“the 
root . . . of equity [is] the idea that the law should be fairly administered and that hard cases should as far as 
possible be avoided”). BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 65 (1921) (““[W]hen the 
social needs demand one settlement rather than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore 
history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of larger ends.”); Colin C. Campbell, The Court of Equity—A Theory of 
its Jurisdiction, 15 GREEN BAG 108, 110 (1903) (noting that principles of equity are a part of the larger concept of 
fairness and justice upon which all law must be based).
306 See Ralph E. Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 186, 187 
(1949). See also PHILEMON BLISS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF PLEADING 15 (3d ed. 1894) (codes “affect 
modes of procedure”); Mildred Coe & Lewis Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field 
Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 240-43 (1942); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: An 
Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 329-30 (1988).
307 See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 476-495 
(2003).
308 See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 495-514 
(2003).
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Moreover, the assumption that a merged court can apply the substantive 
principles of law and equity is an uncertain one. To be sure, many statutes 
and common law doctrines have incorporated the fundamental equitable 
principle of individualized justice. This principle is reflected in the 
evolution of broad principles as opposed to narrow rules,309 broad grants of 
discretionary authority,310 variable standards of conduct,311 balancing 
tests,312 lee ways of precedent,313 and the acceptance of legal fictions.314
That equity intervenes when there is no adequate remedy at law is a most 
familiar refrain.315 Courts frequently exercise their broad discretion to 
award various equitable remedies. And courts have used the awesome 
power of equity to create entirely new rights.316
Yet the legacy of Equity could not be fully preserved in a merged 
system. Law and equity cannot be blended or homogenized because they 
are fundamental antitheses.317 Each system has a function to perform which 
requires some freedom to act upon the other.318 “To perform its high office, 
equity must be administered as a check upon strict law and in opposition to 
it. This requires for equity a selfhood.”319
309
. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 98, 158–62 (1991); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
165 (1985).
310
. See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and 
the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251–59 (1980); ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 123–24 (1982).
311
. See generally Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); James Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 
51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Aaron Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design 
Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982).
312
. See generally Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319 (1992); T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); James G. Wilson, Surveying the 
Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1995).
313
. See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t: When Do We Kiss It and 
When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605 (1990); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991).
314
. See generally LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal 
Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT 
LAW 17–36 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1910) (1861).
315
. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 
(1990); Daniel J. Morrissey, S.E.C. Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427 (2001).
316
. See generally William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition, 56 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (1993). See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J.) (invoking the “judiciary’s historic equitable remedial powers” in the school desegregation context 
to require busing). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); 
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); 
MALCOLM M. FEELY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE 
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (2000); GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s use of equity to implement a political vision that is inconsistent with positive 
law). But see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999)
(limiting scope of substantive equity to rights existing in 1789).
317
 Percy J. Bordwell, The Resurgence of Equity, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 741, 747 (1934) (“In an indiscriminate 
“fusing” or an indiscriminate borrowing, these principles are likely to be lost. They are likely to be lost even in the 
administration of equity itself by judges with only a legal point of view.”).
318
 Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, __ TEX. L. REV. 244, 248 (__);
319
 Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, __ TEX. L. REV. 244, 255 (__).
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IV.  CONTEMPORARY DUAL SYSTEMS—THE DIALECTIC IN PRACTICE
ADR stepped into the breach by operating as a check upon the “strict 
law” that is now codified in the procedures of the merged system. ADR 
emerged to offer procedural flexibility and discretion.320 And by channeling 
Equity’s emphasis on the moral and ethical significance of individualized 
justice, it offered an alternative substantive vision.321 But as Professor 
Resnik’s Schwarz lecture details in full,322 we should beware the 
boomerang.323
ADR was meant to challenge the adversarial system, but has instead 
been taken over by formal adjudication while, at the same time, itself 
becoming more formalized and adversarial.324 First, the courts have been 
ADRized.325 Proponents of ADR have succeeded in making it an integral 
part of our judicial system.326
Via legislation, national and local rule making, and executive proclamation, 
every branch of the federal government has signalled [CQ] its support of 
ADR…. [A]pproval in theory of ADR has become commonplace.327
The irony of the institutionalization and co-optation by courts of a litigation 
alternative has been fully discussed.328 Yet the path toward full integration 
320 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
321 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
322
 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 253-54 (1995);
323 See n. __.
324
 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 253-54 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary 
Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR,” 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 5, 13-16 (1991); Lucy V. 
Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the 
Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 5.
325
 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait 
Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 300 (1996) 
(discussing the “ADRization” of the courts). See J. Clark Kelso & Thomas J. Stipanowich, Protecting Consumers 
in Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1998, at 11.
326
 Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. __, 246-47 (1996); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 213 (1995); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR 
and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 302 (1996).
327
 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 239-40 (1995).
328 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 
10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 262-63 (1995) (citing Craig A. McEwen, Lynn Mather & Richard J. 
Maiman, Lawyers in and Everyday Life: Mediation in Divorce Practice, 28 J. L. & Soc., 149, 183 (1994) 
(Mediation of divorce in Maine as is used in “heavily litigated” cases, relies on “legal rules,” serves as a 
“relatively formal adjunct to negotiation,” and “strengthens … the ability of lawyers to influence decisions.”)); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The 
Law of ADR,” 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 5, 13-16 (1991) (ADR was meant to “challenge” the adversarial system, 
but instead ADR has been taken over and changed by the system. Capture, “colonization,” and co-optation have 
transformed ADR into “just another stop in the ‘litigotiation’ game); Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 5 
(“voluntary nature of alternatives has been eroded,” and it is problematic for ADR to take on formalistic 
characteristics of adjudication). See also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea 
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has been paved, and the road named.329 “CDR,” which stands for 
complementary dispute resolution,330 quite literally takes the “alternative” 
out of ADR.
Meanwhile, the flexibility and informality of ADR is under siege. As 
ADR becomes increasingly popular,331 there appears the inexorable desire 
to crystallize its processes.332 This “creeping legalism” makes ADR more 
complex, costly, and time-consuming.333 It should hardly surprise, then, that 
the contemporary empirical data fails to demonstrate conclusively that any 
forms of ADR are, in fact, faster or cheaper than formal adjudication.334 Yet 
the commentators offer still more ideas adding layers of reforms.335
for Statutory Reform, 5 J. Disp. Resol. 231, 233 (1990) (criticizing Supreme Court enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate as undermining the volition critical to arbitration’s integrity, and lauding arbitration for its capacity to 
provide “adjudicatory, self-determination”); Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, Cal. Law., Feb. 1994, at 
53-54 (growing concern about the bills of court-appointed, court-annexed ADR providers); Susan S. Silbey, 
Mediation Mythology, 9 Negotiation J. 349, 353 (1993) (critiquing proposed “guidelines for selecting mediators” 
as both wrongly portraying the role and also restricting access to the profession). Cf. Edward Brunet, Arbitration 
and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rev.81 (1992) (calling for constitutional rights in private contractual 
arbitration to ensure due process fairness).
329
 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait 
Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 308 (1996) 
(advocating adoption of more ADR practices).
330
 Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1291 & n.3 (1998).
331 See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
332 SHELDON AMOS, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 57 (1875).
333
 Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58- APR DISP. RESOL. J. 37, 38 & n.1 
(Feb.-Apr. 2003).
334 See generally Deborah R. Hensler, What We Know and Don’t Know About Court-Administered 
Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986) (finding no significant, demonstrable savings in court-annexed ADR); 
Deborah R. Hensler, RAND’s Rebuttal: CJRA Study Results Reflect Court ADR Usage, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO THE 
HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 79 (1997) (finding court-annexed arbitration had little effect on time to disposition or 
costs); James S. Kakalik et al., An Evaluation of Mediation an dearly Neutral Evaluation Under the civil Justice 
Reform Act 48-53 (RAND 1996) (arguing that arbitration, mediation, and early neutral evaluation produced no 
“statistically significant” reductions in time to disposition, the costs of litigation, perceptions of fairness, or client 
satisfaction); Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587 (1995) (“Efficiency gains from court-
annexed arbitration and court-mandated family mediation in custody suits appear mixed: The fiscal savings to 
courts from diverting cases from trial may be outweighed by the costs of running an efficient ADR program, and 
savings in lawyer time are often modest and not necessarily passed on to litigants through lower legal fees.”); 
Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on Competitiveness’s Agenda for 
Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 248 (1992) (“Mandated settlement conferences have been in use in state trial 
courts for at least four decades. Their effectiveness at saving costs has yet to be demonstrated empirically.”); Lisa 
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration 
Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2211 (1993) (“there is no conclusive evidence that [court-annexed ADR] 
programs reduce either the private or social costs of disputing”); Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical 
Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 834 (2000) (“cases referred by courts to 
ADR activities … lasted longer, on average, than the mean for all cases”); Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 889 (1991) (comparing districts with and without 
court-annexed ADR and finding that “ADR districts are neither more efficient nor less efficient in handling 
caseloads or inducing settlement than peer districts”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an 
Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 9 n.33 
(1991) (collecting sources).
Until [1973], when the [American Arbitration Association’s] 50-year-old logo was redesigned, its motto was 
“Speed, Economy, and Justice.” That year [the Association’s president, Robert Coulson] dropped the motto. 
“People used to promote arbitration with those adjectives like religious zealots,” he says. “I don’t think any of 
these words are entirely accurate.”
James Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, AM. LAWYER 107, 107 (Jan./Feb. 1985). See 
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For decades, practitioners have reported that arbitration is neither faster 
nor cheaper than more formal adjudication.336 This is surely attributable, at 
least in part, to the fact that many of the procedural bells and whistles of 
formal adjudication have been incorporated into arbitration proceedings.337
Arbitrators are often statutorily vested with broad judicial powers to 
also Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S. Abrahams, The Trouble with Arbitration, , LITIG. Winter 1985, at 30 (“Today’s 
research confirms what Hart and Sacks saw twenty-six years ago: arbitration may be quicker than litigation, but it 
is not less expensive.”); Richard J. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAW, Feb. 1994, at 54-55 (using 
anecdotal information to question whether arbitration is really cheaper than litigation); Thomas J. Stipanowich, 
Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 452-76 (1988) (observing that many survey respondents 
disagreed that arbitration was faster and cheaper than litigation).
On the other hand, of course, there are many who trumpet the time and cost savings associated with ADR—
particularly outside the arena of court-annexed ADR.
The Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution claims that for a five-year period ending in 
1995, 652 companies using CPR panelists reported a total cost savings of over $200 million, with an average 
cost savings of over $300,000 per company. A 1993 article contended that since 1990, 406 companies saved 
more than $150 million in legal fees and expert-witness costs by using litigation alternatives in cases with an 
aggregate of over $5 billion in dispute. One insurance carrier allegedly saved between $150,000 to $200,000 
per case by mediating disputes pursuant to a pact negotiated by the Institute for Dispute Resolution.
Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2105 (2002) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).
335
 Recent proposed protocols call for elements such as the right to a competent and impartial neutral, 
represenation, prehearing access to reasonably relevant information, full availability of remedies, and reasoned, 
written opinions. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 987-88 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 19, 60 (1999). For a sample of reform efforts regarding the Uniform Model Mediation Act, see, e.g.,
Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 787 (1998); Model 
Mediation law Effort Begins, Disp. Resol. Mag., Fall 1997, at 20; expanded judicial review of arbitration awards, 
see, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 
BUFF. L. REV. 49, 124-29 (1997) (contending that parties should be allowed to incorporate a desired level of 
judicial review into their contract); Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error—An Option 
to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 103, 11016 (1997) (arguing that parties ought to be able to contract 
for whatever level of judicial review will serve the parties’ interests, but suggestinglimiting review to legal error 
to avoid substantial increased costs); Leanne Montgomery, Casenote, Expanded Judicial Review of Commercial 
Arbitration Awards—Bargaining for the Best of Both Worlds: Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 
F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 554 (2000) (reviewing the Lapine decision and concluding that 
contracting for increased judicial review may encourage continued use of arbitration)); personal liability for 
arbitrators, see Mark A. Sponseller, Note, Redefining Arbitral Immunity: A Proposed Qualified Immunity Statute 
for Arbitrators, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 421,421 (1993); Note, Gaar v. Tigerman: An Attack on Absolute Immunity for 
Arbitrators!, 21 CAL. L. REV. 564, 585 (1985); amending arbitration laws to protect the contracting process from 
corruption, see Steven Goering, The Standard of Impartiality as Applied to Arbitrators by the Federal Courts and 
Codes of Ethics, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 821, 832 (1990); oversight of arbitrators, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ 
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 408, 419 (1997); ethics reforms, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and 
Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 166-92 (1999); prohibiting ADR in 
certain cases, Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. __, 298 (1996). See generally Cameron L. Sabin, Note, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: 
Private Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1362 (2002).
336 Creeping Legalism in Labor Arbitration, 13 ARBITRATION J. 129 (1958); James Lyons, Arbitration: The 
Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 107, 110 (Jan./Feb. 1985) (“‘I tell my clients,’ 
one lawyer says, ‘that it should cost just as much for a complex construction arbitration as it costs for 
litigation.’”); James Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 107, 
110 (Jan./Feb. 1985) (“But, as one arbitration veteran warns, ‘Once you get Wall Street lawyers in there, you 
might as well go to court.’ The Kaiser/Condec arbitration is an extravagant—but not unique—deomnstration of 
the fact that the costs of arbitration rise dramatically if the parties hire big outside law firms, call large numbers of 
witnesses, and present elaborate technical arguments.”).
337 See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
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administer depositions338 and discovery,339 including subpoena340 and 
sanction powers.341 Arbitrators often write opinions,342 and their cases grow 
increasingly complex through consolidation and intervention.343
The public, or at least lawyers, appear to want still more 
formalization.344 The major ADR providers have voluntarily moved to 
bolster the “due process guarantees” of their processes.345 And an 
advertisement for National Arbitration Forum in a recent issue of the ABA 
Journal reads: 
All Arbitration is Not the Same. Unlike the others, only the Forum offers a 
national panel of seasoned legal professionals and a procedural code requiring 
arbitrators to follow the law in making decisions and awards. To learn more 
about the National Arbitration Forum, log onto the world wide web at 
www.arbitration-forum.com.346
Professor Sherman’s conclusion, in 1993, that ADR and formal adjudication 
had “a great deal in common” grows ever truer.347
V.  MAKING THE CASE FOR EQUITY IN ADR
Equity is a metaphor for the commitment that the law will be readily 
adaptable for, and directed toward the achievement of justice. It is fortunate, 
then, that Equity enjoys a certain inevitability throughout history.348 When 
the rigidity of the Law courts failed to keep pace with the growing wants of 
society, the discretionary and flexible system of Equity provided the 
sensible remedies.349 Similarly, when the forms and modes of formal
338 See Unif. Arbitration Act § 7, 7 ULA 199; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1283, 1283.05.
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340 See 9 U.S.C. § 7; Unif. Arbitration Act § 7, 7 ULA 199; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1282.6.
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adjudication became insufferable, ADR emerged to provide a sensible 
method of dispute resolution that was discretionary and flexible.350 ADR 
offered a check upon the “strict law” that was codified in the procedures of 
formal adjudication and acted in opposition to it.351 It generated 
experimental methods of dispute resolution with fresh perspectives on 
procedural and social justice.352
Yet the law’s demand for certainty is Equity’s foil. An ironic 
consequence of Equity’s success was the ensuing effort to crystallize the 
jurisprudence of that court.353 The gradual introduction of procedural rules 
and structural orthodoxy ultimately caused Equity to collapse under the 
weight of its own precedents and processes.354 The legacy of Equity was 
preserved in those doctrines that had been adopted by the Law courts,355 but 
equity was less dynamic and generative in the merged system.356
ADR reanimated the spirit of equity. But because of its tremendous 
popularity,357 ADR now faces a wave of reforms that would transform its 
flexible and discretionary modes of resolution into a more systematic 
framework.358 One might suggest, of course, that this transformation of 
ADR is inevitable in light of the ongoing dialectic between law and equity. 
Moreover, the inevitability of equity, too, will ultimately resurface 
thereafter in some form or another (as ADR succeeded Equity). Those 
suggestions, though accurate, do not justify inaction, however, because we 
can control the pace and trajectory of that progression.
The history of Law and Equity offers a cautionary tale about the 
benefits of systematization. To be sure, the lot of recent and proposed 
reforms to ADR are derived of noble intents and purposes.359 However, we 
should be skeptical of that which introduces detail and complexity. Lord 
Hardwicke probably did not anticipate that by weaving “the strands of 
judicial decision into the indestructible fabric of equitable jurisprudence” he 
was crafting the cloth that would later asphyxiate his beloved Equity.360
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The moral growth of the law is the record of the slow emergence of 
equity into the mainstream of the law.361 Dialectic requires dialogue, and it 
is through the interplay of law and equity that both are enriched.362
Law and equity should be in continual progress, with the former constantly 
gaining ground upon the latter. Every new and extraordinary interposition is, 
by length of time, converted into an old rule. A great part of what is now strict 
law was formerly considered as equity, and the equitable decisions of this age 
will unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of the next.363
The certain and uniform application by courts of fixed general laws serves 
many functions beyond the resolution of disputes.364 The symmetry and 
efficiency that strict law provides is essential not only to justice, but also to 
equity. Maitland said that a system of Equity without Law would be 
“anarchy” (the “castle in the air”); but less often quoted is his statement that 
a system of Law without Equity would be “barbarous, unjust, [and] 
absurd.”365 Justice thus requires certainty and predictability, on one hand, 
and the ameliorating exercise of discretion, on the other.366 Neither Law nor 
Equity can perform the other’s function; a merged system performs neither 
function particularly well, and tends to rigidify.367
ADR thus plays an important role in the growth of the law. Without that 
engine, “our law will be moribund, or worse.”368 Of course an Equity model 
for ADR requires one to accept that these cases may be decided in fora that 
do not offer all of the trappings of formal due process or the familiar 
characteristics of dispute resolution.369 This prospect may be especially 
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unsettling in light of the large numbers and broad types of disputes that 
courts send or litigants take to ADR.370 But an Equity model suggests that 
the response to this phenomenon lies not with reforms to the system of 
ADR that is attracting (or receiving) these cases. Rather the answer suggests 
reforms to the formal system that is scaring (or sending) them away. After 
all, ADR must remain a “living, changing thing, forever adapting itself to 
new conditions.”371
The Equity model would suggest that ADR should hear and decide only 
those types of cases where the formal courts fail to provide an adequate 
remedy.372 Equity respected the authority of the Law courts and did not 
interfere in cases where the remedy was adequate.373 Of course if the formal 
courts did not provide an adequate remedy and the case proceeded in ADR, 
the Equity model would counsel against interference by the formal system. 
Neutrals in the independent system of ADR would be free to adapt to the 
challenges of the case before them without obligation or duty to external 
statutes or rules. And it would be the repeated exercise of this kind of 
jurisdiction that would identify systemic failures of the formal system and, 
ultimately, have a reforming influence thereon.374
In this model, then, the courts and the legislature would be able to 
“prevent” any case from going to ADR by simply providing an adequate 
remedy. The adequate remedy might itself be an alternative method that had 
been incorporated into the courts. Procedural reform would continue to 
focus on a taxonomy or classification system for allocating particular types 
of disputes between ADR and different dispute resolution forms.375 The 
target of those reforms, however, would be the “formal” adjudication 
process rather than the separate system of ADR.
An appreciation for the role of ADR in a dual system founded in 
principles of Law and Equity would transform courts and de-regulate ADR. 
Presumably courts and legislators would develop a set of jurisdictional 
principles that would delimit those areas, if any, in which it need not 
provide an adequate remedy. “To devise better court procedures, we must at 
some point determine what special role courts—in contrast to other 
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agencies—can most usefully play in delivering justice to the people.”376 The 
reconceptualization exercise imagined here offers insight into that process.
CONCLUSION
A dialectic of law and equity can be traced from the dual traditional 
systems of Law and Equity to the contemporary systems of formal 
adjudication and ADR. The equitization of Law and the legalization of 
Equity led ultimately to the merger of Law and Equity. In contemporary 
adjudication we are experiencing, simultaneously, the ADRization of 
litigation and the litigization of ADR. The merger of Law and Equity offers 
a cautionary tale that discourages the trajectory of current ADR reforms. 
Instead, ADR should be de-regulated and the formal courts encouraged to 
develop more effective means and modes of dispute resolution.
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